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ABSTRACT 
Criminal sanctions are a necessary and appropriate response to 
crime. But extremism, especially when coupled with a slavish and  
unthinking adherence to traditional practices, nearly always produces 
unfortunate consequences. Such is the case with the rapid growth in  
prison numbers in the United States over the past two decades. The 
prime purpose of imprisonment is to punish serious offenders and to  
prevent them from reoffending during the period of detention. The  
overuse of imprisonment has resulted in the violation of the most  
cardinal moral prohibition associated with imprisonment: punishing the 
innocent. The runaway cost of the prison budget has resulted in the 
community being needlessly punished to the tune of tens of billions of 
dollars annually. This is money that cannot be spent on profoundly  
important social services such as health and education. This Article of-
fers a solution to this abhorrent public policy failing. We propose new 
forms of punishment that are more cost efficient than jail and that 
achieve all of the purported benefits of imprisonment: incapacitation and 
deterrence. The proposed sanctions are in two main forms. The first 
sanction is twenty-four-hour technological monitoring of every  
movement by an offender. The second sanction targets educational and 
employment pursuits of offenders in combination with disgorgement and 
clawback remedies. It is suggested that one or both of these sanctions can 
replace imprisonment as the sanction of choice for all current prisoners 
except serious sexual and violent offenders. This would result in an  
approximate halving of the number of offenders in United States prisons. 
If this solution is not effective and United States political sentencing  
realities compel the continuing addiction to imprisonment at the expense 
of all alternatives, there is still a better way forward. The United States 
should open up the housing of its prisoners to price based competition: 
states and emerging economies should be allowed to compete to provide 
prison accommodation in an efficient manner. We propose that this may 
be undertaken subject to binding and enforceable commitments made by 
these states to adhere to basic human rights standards and appropriate 
levels of accommodation and amenities. 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States sentencing system has remained remarkably  
resistant to change. Technological advances have resulted in profound 
changes to every human endeavour. Standing stubbornly outside this 
trend is the manner in which the criminal justice system deals with  
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criminals. Confining criminals behind large walls remains the orthodox 
method for punishing serious offenders, as it has since the British  
colonization of the Americas more than 500 years ago. As former  
Attorney General Eric Holder said, “too many Americans go to too many 
prisons for far too long, and for no truly good law enforcement reason. 
It’s clear, at a basic level, that 20th century criminal justice solutions are 
not adequate to overcome our 21st century challenges.”1 Moreover,  
imprisonment in the U.S. has stark implications for racial equality and 
for innocent families. As an influential study by the National Research 
Council noted “[i]n 2010, blacks were incarcerated at six times and  
Hispanics at three times the rate for non-Hispanic whites,”2 and “the 
number of children with an incarcerated father increased from about 
350,000 to 2.1 million—about 3 percent of all U.S. children” in the two 
decades between 1980 and 2000.3 
The continued emphasis on imprisonment as the dominant method 
of punishment represents an abject failure of intellect and a profound 
social and political policy mistake. Technological advances provide more 
efficient and humane techniques to achieve most of the appropriate and 
attainable objectives of imprisonment. This error is compounded  
dramatically by the unprecedented surge in the growth in imprisonment 
numbers of the past two decades in the U.S. The increase in the use of 
imprisonment in the U.S. is staggering by any measure. The U.S.  
imprisons more of its citizens than any country on earth—and by a large 
margin.4 
Criminals elicit little, if any, community empathy, and hence in a 
democracy it is not surprising that political and public policy reforms 
that involve sterner punishments are developed and implemented in a 
largely unabated manner. Theoretical concerns regarding the legitimacy 
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 1. Eric Holder, Attorney General, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the American Bar  
Association’s House of Delegates (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/ 
2013/ag-speech-130812.html [https://perma.cc/FJ7C-PT26]. He went on to note that “[w]hile the 
entire U.S. population has increased by about a third since 1980, the federal prison population has 
grown at an astonishing rate—by almost 800 percent. . . . [F]ederal prisons are operating at nearly 40 
percent above capacity. Even though this country comprises just 5 percent of the world’s population, 
we incarcerate almost a quarter of the world’s prisoners. More than 219,000 federal inmates are 
currently behind bars. Almost half of them are serving time for drug-related crimes, and many have 
substance use disorders. Nine to 10 million more people cycle through America’s local jails each 
year. And roughly 40 percent of former federal prisoners—and more than 60 percent of former state 
prisoners—are rearrested or have their supervision revoked within three years after their release.” 
 2. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: 
EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 2 (2014) [hereinafter GROWTH OF INCARCERATION]. 
 3. Id. at 260. 
 4. See infra Part V. 
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or desirability of harsher sanctions have not curtailed the rise in  
imprisonment numbers. Pragmatic considerations might be capable of 
having a greater influence. The massive amount of public spending on 
prisons is a significant incursion into the public revenue and a deviation 
from cardinal community enhancing reforms, such as health and  
education. 
Moreover, the empirical evidence regarding the efficacy of  
state-imposed sanctions to achieve established sentencing goals indicates 
that most of them are unattainable.5 Punishment does not meaningfully 
deter; it rarely reforms and often does not prevent offenders from  
committing serious crime. In short, the obsession with imprisonment 
rarely has a beneficial outcome and it comes at a striking cost to the 
community. This is acknowledged by the 2014 National Research  
Council Report, which concluded: 
[An] increase in incarceration may have caused a decrease in crime, 
but the magnitude of the reduction is highly uncertain and the  
results of most studies suggest it was unlikely to have been  
large. . . . The incremental deterrent effect of increases in lengthy 
prison sentences is modest at best.6  
The unthinking and unbridled use of imprisonment has led to a 
lamentable irony. The strongest theoretical prohibition associated with 
punishment is punishing the innocent—many jurists regard this as an 
absolute limitation. Theoretical arguments have been utterly ineffective 
at reducing prison numbers.7 This has resulted in a heavy fiscal burden 
on the community, one that is arguably so weighty (and so lacking in 
redeeming features) that the community is now unwittingly punishing 
itself. This Article sets out reasons and mechanisms to cease this macro 
self-inflicted harm. 
We are not advocating for the closure of prisons. The key  
advantage of jail is that it ensures that an offender does not offend during 
his or her term of imprisonment. The second main benefit of  
                                                     
 5. See infra Part IV. 
 6. GROWTH OF INCARCERATION, supra note 2, 4–5. 
 7. Scholars have argued for many years that massively increasing prison numbers is without 
justification, yet as we have seen, the last few decades have seen incarceration levels reach record 
highs. See, e.g., MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 134 (1996); Albert W Alschuler,  
Disparity: The Normative and Empirical Failure of the Federal Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. REV. 85, 
92–93 (2005); Richard Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the Eighth 
Amendment: “Proportionality” Relative to What?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 571 (2005); Richard Frase, 
Sentencing Principles in Theory and Practice, 22 CRIME & JUST. 363 (1997); Cassia Spohn,  
Twentieth-Century Sentencing Reform Movement: Looking Backward, Moving Forward, 13 
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 535, 536 (2014); Michael Tonry, Remodeling American Sentencing: A 
Ten-Step Blueprint for Moving Past Mass Incarceration, 13 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 503 
(2014); GROWTH OF INCARCERATION, supra note 2, at 116–17, 121–22. 
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imprisonment is that it constitutes a considerable hardship. We do not 
contend that any single sanction or combination of sanctions can or 
should completely replace imprisonment as an instrument of criminal 
punishment. Rather, we propose that certain cohorts of prisoners should 
be subjected to new forms of sanctions. These cohorts fall into two main 
groups. The first group would be comprised of offenders guilty of crimes 
that are not sufficiently serious to warrant incarceration, as we argue that 
the current sentencing regime is too harsh against certain forms of  
offenders, namely nonsexual and nonviolent offenders. The second group 
would be comprised of prisoners who have committed relatively serious 
offences but do not present a strong risk of reoffending. This group 
would consist mainly of first-time, mid-range sexual and violent  
offenders. This entails that prisons be used mainly for recidivist sexual 
and violent offences, unless one’s first offence is particularly serious. For 
both groups, we advocate alternative sanctions including the greater use 
of electronic monitoring and active Global Positioning Systems (GPS) 
(sometimes coupled with Closed Circuit Television) surveillance. Other 
dangerous violent and sexual criminals should be subjected to  
incapacitation in conventional prisons. However, we argue that there 
should be competition for locating these prisons based on price (and  
subject to nonnegotiable standards of comfort, cleanliness, and range of 
amenities)8 in order to achieve incapacitation in a cost-efficient manner. 
Thus, we recommend fundamental and wide-ranging reform in the 
manner in which we punish criminal offenders. The reforms will make 
the criminal justice system fairer and more efficient and would result in 
massive public expenditure savings by slashing tens of billions of dollars 
from the annual cost of running prisons. They will also ensure that  
community safety is not diminished and, in fact, if some of the savings 
from the prisons’ budget are spent on providing a greater visible police 
presence, the crime rate will almost certainly drop. 
If it transpires that theoretical arguments cannot negate or soften the 
“tough on crime agenda,” the only rational course is to make housing 
prisoners as least damaging as possible to the community, while ensuring 
a high baseline level of accommodation for prisoners. This entails that 
we should consider outsourcing prisoners to other nations who can  
provide the service far more economically without reducing the  
conditions in which prisoners are housed. 
We will first begin with an overview of the current use of  
imprisonment as a criminal sanction. Part II then examines the  
theoretical nature of punishment and provides the backdrop to Part III 
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where we propose a number of new sanctions that will reduce the  
reliance on imprisonment. We will also consider possible objections to 
our proposal, in that it will undercut the efficacy of the criminal justice 
system to achieve the objectives of incapacitation, deterrence, and  
rehabilitation in Part IV. This is followed in Part V by a proposal to  
situate jails in cheaper states within the U.S. or to outsource much of the 
imprisonment program to developing countries. 
I. THE CURRENT PICTURE OF IMPRISONMENT: NUMBERS, DOLLARS,  
AND HARSHNESS 
Imprisonment is the cornerstone of criminal punishment and the 
harshest sanction in most developed countries, except the United States 
and Japan, which still impose the death penalty in rare instances.  
Imprisonment has one clear benefit: it is an effective means of depriving 
offenders of their liberty9 and protecting the community from further 
criminal acts during the period of incarceration. 
The U.S. has embraced imprisonment with more enthusiasm than 
any other nation on Earth. Presently, more than two million Americans 
are in confinement,10 which equates to more than seven prisoners per one 
thousand adults in the population.11 This rate has more than doubled over 
the past two decades.12 
Most developed countries have rates of imprisonment profoundly 
lower than the U.S. It has recently been noted that: 
U.S. incarceration is . . . striking when compared to incarceration in 
other countries. In fact, the United States incarcerates over 20  
percent of the world’s prisoners despite having less than 5 percent 
of the world’s population. . . . [The] U.S. incarceration rate is over 
four times the world average rate (Walmsley 2016). 13  
                                                     
 9. For an account of the development and use of imprisonment as a criminal sanction, see 
CHRISTOPHER HARDING & RICHARD W. IRELAND, PUNISHMENT: RHETORIC, RULE, AND PRACTICE 
193–98 (1989). 
 10. LAUREN E. GLAZE & ERINN J. HERBERMAN, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 
SER. NO. NCJ 243936, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2012, 3 (2013). The 
exact number of prisoners is 2,228,400. Id. 
 11. See E. ANN CARSON & DANIELA GOLINELLI, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 
SER. NO. NCJ 243920, PRISONERS IN 2012, TRENDS IN ADMISSIONS AND RELEASES 1991–2012, 
(2013). 
 12. Albert Hunt, A Nation of Inmates, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/21/us/21iht-letter21.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 13. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 
ON INCARCERATION AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 23 (2016) [hereinafter ECONOMIC 
PERSPECTIVES]. 
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The dramatic relative overuse of imprisonment in the U.S. has  
resulted in increasingly commonplace and loud calls for radical change.14 
Vivien Stern, Secretary General of Penal Reform International, states, 
“Among mainstream politicians and commentators in Western Europe, it 
is a truism that the criminal justice system of the United States is an  
inexplicable deformity.”15 
The main drawback of imprisonment, from the community  
perspective, is the cost. Costs have been creeping up gradually over the 
past few decades, and it is only in recent years that the tipping point has 
been such that several commentators have expressly noted that every 
dollar spent on prisons is a dollar lost for spending on activities such as 
health and education.16 This calculation is not new. What is new and has 
compelled attention is the magnitude of the sums involved. In terms of 
expenditure, it costs taxpayers in the U.S. on average $31,000 in direct 
expenditures to house a prisoner for one year.17 The total spending on 
prisons is now more than $80 billion annually.18 The scale of this, even 
for the world’s largest economy, is considerable, especially when overall 
the total expenditure on the U.S. criminal justice system is $270  
billion—equating to $870 per capita.19 
                                                     
 14. It is widely accepted that the United States has a “serious over-punishment” and “mass 
incarceration” problem. See ANTHONY C. THOMPSON, RELEASING PRISONERS, REDEEMING 
COMMUNITIES: RE-ENTRY, RACE, AND POLITICS (2009); Sharon Dolovich, Creating the Permanent 
Prisoner, in LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE: AMERICA’S NEW DEATH PENALTY? 96 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. 
& Austin Sarat, eds., 2012); Lynn Adelman, What the Sentencing Commission Ought to Be Doing: 
Reducing Mass Incarceration, 18 MICH. J. RACE & L. 295 (2013); David Cole, Turning the Corner 
on Mass Incarceration?, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 27 (2011); Bernard E. Harcourt, Keynote: The Crisis 
and Criminal Justice, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 965 (2012); Andrew E. Taslitz, The Criminal Republic: 
Democratic Breakdown as a Cause of Mass Incarceration, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 133 (2011); Anne 
Traum, Mass Incarceration at Sentencing, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 423 (2013). 
 15. Vivien Stern, The International Impact of U.S. Policies, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE 
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 279, 280 (Meda Chesney-Lind & Marc 
Mauer, eds., 2002). 
 16. See, e.g., Rebecca Klein, States Are Prioritizing Prisons over Education, Budgets Show, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 31, 2014, 2:29 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com.au/entry/state-
spending-prison-and-education_n_6072318.html?section=australia [https://perma.cc/Q3HN-TTJD]; 
Steven Hawkins, Education vs. Incarceration, AM. PROSPECT (Dec. 6, 2010), 
http://prospect.org/article/education-vs-incarceration [https://perma.cc/CU38-TFR6]. 
 17. According to a study by the Vera Justice Center, the average cost of a prisoner is 
$31000/year. This is higher in some states and cities; for example, in NY State the average cost is 
$60,000/year, and in NYC it is $168,000 per year. See Marc Santora, City’s Annual Cost Per Inmate 
is $168,000, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2013/08/24/nyregion/citys-annual-cost-per-inmate-is-nearly-168000-study-says.html?_r=0. 
 18. Melissa Kearney & Benjamin Harris, Ten Economic Facts About Crime and Incarceration 
in the United States, BROOKINGS 13 (May 1, 2014), http://www.brookings.edu/ 
research/reports/2014/05/10-crime-facts [https://perma.cc/JJ5M-PQBP]. This is $260 per capita. 
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES, supra note 13, at 5. 
 19. ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES, supra note 13, at 5. 
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California and ten other states spend more on prisons than higher 
education.20 There is now an increasing recognition that something needs 
to be done.21 Change is happening, but painstakingly slowly. In the past 
few years, there has been a small drop in imprisonment numbers. From 
2010 to 2012 there was a reduction of approximately three percent in 
prison numbers. This was followed by a slight rise in 201322 and then 
another slight drop in 2014; however, this was largely offset by an  
increase in local jail numbers.23 
In the federal jurisdiction, the Sentencing Reform and Corrections 
Act of 2015 aims to implement a number of other measures that will  
reduce prison numbers, including reduced sentences for certain offences, 
such as drug offences. These changes would apply retroactively in some 
cases.24 A number of Republican states, including Oklahoma25 and  
                                                     
 20. Hansook Oh, California Budgets $1 Billion More to Prisons than to Higher Education and 
Leaves Students Hanging, SUNDIAL (Sept. 19, 2012), http://sundial.csun.edu/2012/09/california-
budgets-1-billion-more-to-prisons-than-higher-education-and-leaves-students-hanging/ 
[https://perma.cc/RYK3-S7VX]; ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES, supra note 13, at 44. 
 21. For example, in July 2015, President Barack Obama “called for lowering—if not ending—
mandatory minimum sentences for nonviolent drug offenses, restoring the voting rights of ex-felons, 
revisiting hiring practices that require applicants to list criminal activity, and expanding job training 
programs so inmates are better prepared to reintegrate into society.” Sabrina Siddiqui, ‘An Injustice 
System’: Obama’s Prison Tour Latest in Late-Term Reform Agenda, GUARDIAN (July 16, 2015, 6:43 
PM), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jul/16/barack-obama-prison-tour-criminal-justice-
race-reform [https://perma.cc/3S3J-R4XB]. 
 22. Press Release, Bureau of Just. Stat., US Prison Population Declined for Third Consecutive 
Year During 2012, (July 25, 2013, 10:00 AM), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/ 
press/p12acpr.cfm [https://perma.cc/G4GH-XKYC]. The decline only focused on prisoners  
completing terms of one year of more in prisoners and fell from a high of 1,615,487 prisoners in 
2009 to 1,571,013 in 2012. See id. 
 23. See Matthew Friedman, The U.S. Prison Population is Down (A Little), BRENNAN CENTER 
FOR JUST. (Oct. 29, 2015), http://www.brennancenter.org/blog/us-prison-population-down-little 
[https://perma.cc/XB75-XP28]. State and federal prison numbers decreased by 15,400 people from 
December 31, 2013 to December 31, 2014. Id. However, county and city jail numbers increased by 
13,384 inmates from midyear 2013 to midyear 2014. Id. 
 24. For a summary of the provisions, see Douglas A. Berman, Basic Elements of Sentencing 
Reform and Corrections Act of 2015, SENT’G L. & POL’Y (Oct. 1, 2015, 10:33 AM), 
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2015/10/basic-elements-of-sentencing-
reform-and-corrections-act-of-2015.html [https://perma.cc/94YQ-WGVP]; see also Editorial Board, 
Toward Saner, More Effective Prison Sentences, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/04/opinion/sunday/toward-saner-more-effective-prison-
sentences.html?_r=0 (lauding the Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act of 2015). The bill was 
introduced in the U.S. Senate on October 1, 2015, and approved by the U.S. Senate Judiciary  
Committee on October 22, 2015. Changes were made to it on April 28, 2016. A similar bill has been 
introduced into the House of Representatives. See Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act of 2015, 
S. 2123, 114th Cong. (2015). 
 25. Barbara Hoberock, Criminal Justice Reform Bills Signed into Law by Oklahoma Governor 
(Apr. 28, 2016, 12:01 AM), http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/capitol_report/criminal-justice-
reform-bills-signed-into-law-by-oklahoma-governor/article_842d52ae-4512-5311-899c-
665f31f2e90b.html [https://perma.cc/SQB4-MNU2]. 
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Texas,26 have introduced recent changes that reduce the severity of  
mandatory sentences for nonviolent and nonsexual offences. These 
changes are desirable, but they are piecemeal. This Article proposes 
changes that will provide a more impactful and principled solution. 
Before suggesting ways in which to accelerate the move away from 
imprisonment, we will set out some of the less obvious disadvantages of 
imprisonment. 
This Article so far has focused on the cost of the imprisonment and 
its ineffectiveness at achieving most of the objectives of punishment. 
There is one other reason to curb the use of imprisonment: in many cases 
the degree of punishment is too severe. Prison is not meant to be  
pleasant. However, a closer look at the conditions that inmates endure 
indicates that it is more traumatic than is intended or desirable. The most 
direct and obvious negative impact of imprisonment is the deprivation of 
liberty. In addition to this, there are other “pains” of imprisonment,  
including deprivation of the following: access to goods and services;27 
sexual relationships;28 and security.29 
There are also long-term deprivations stemming from imprisonment 
that transcend the period inmates spend behind bars. The negative  
consequences of imprisonment include significantly reducing life  
expectancy;30 vulnerabilities associated with financial matters; drug 
temptations; decision-making and social interactions;31difficulty  
experienced by former inmates in meeting their own basic needs,  
including hunger, homelessness, and lack of access to health care;32  
negative impacts on family members of prisoners, including higher rates 
                                                     
 26. Ken Cuccinelli, Texas Shows How To Reduce Both Incarceration and Crime, NAT’L REV. 
(May 18, 2016, 4:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/418510/texas-shows-how-reduce-
both-incarceration-and-crime-ken-cuccinelli [https://perma.cc/HB78-KN5G]. 
 27. GRESHAM M. SYKES, THE SOCIETY OF CAPTIVES: A STUDY OF A MAXIMUM SECURITY 
PRISON 67, 68 (2007). 
 28. Id. at 70, 71; see also ROBERT JOHNSON & HANS TOCH, INTRODUCTION TO THE PAINS OF 
IMPRISONMENT (Robert Johnson & Hans Toch, eds., 1982). 
 29. Id. at 76, 77. 
 30. A study that examined the 15.5-year survival rate of 23,510 ex-prisoners in the U.S. State 
of Georgia, found much higher mortality rates for ex-prisoners than for the rest of the population. 
There were 2,650 deaths in total, which was a 43% higher mortality rate than normally expected 
(799 more ex-prisoners died than expected). The main causes for the increased mortality rates were 
homicide, transportation accidents, accidental poisoning (including drug overdoses), and suicide. See 
Anne C. Spaulding, Prisoner Survival Inside and Outside of the Institution: Implications for  
Health-Care Planning, 173 AM. J. EPIDEMIOL. 479, 482 (2011); see also GROWTH OF 
INCARCERATION, supra note 2, at 220–26. 
 31. MICHAEL ROGUSKI & FLEUR CHAUVEL, THE EFFECTS OF IMPRISONMENT ON INMATES’ 
AND THEIR FAMILIES’ HEALTH AND WELLBEING 61 (2009). A limitation of this research is that it 
had a small sample size—consisting only of 63 participants. Id. at 3. 
 32. Id. 
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of divorce;33 homelessness;34 higher rates of depression, anxiety, and  
antisocial behaviour among children of inmates;35 and difficulty in  
securing employment and lower rate of life time earnings.36 
It is pertinent to note that the prison experience does not necessarily 
need to be so harsh. Prisons could be designed and managed in a manner 
where the main deprivation is the denial of liberty and still achieve the 
key objectives of punishing offenders and protecting the community. 
Something close to this approach is endorsed in Scandinavia, where  
imprisonment rates are considerably less than one person per one  
thousand adults compared to the seven per one thousand adults in the 
U.S., i.e., about 15% of the rate in the U.S.37 Additionally, and more  
importantly for the purposes of this Article, when offenders are  
sentenced to imprisonment in Scandinavian countries, they are treated far 
more humanely than in the U.S. As noted by Matthew DeMichele from 
the Penn State Justice Center for Research: 
Scandinavian prisons operate under the philosophy of normalization 
in which the punishment is the removal of liberty; that is,  
incapacitation is the punishment (Pratt, 2008). The incarceration 
experience should resemble normal life as closely as possible to 
prepare the individual for release. In the United States, being  
incarcerated is only one aspect of the punishment; the rough living 
conditions and treatment of the inmate are another. . . . Numerous 
differences exist between U.S. and Scandinavian criminal justice 
systems: Recruitment, training, and health care are provided in the 
community (not in the prisons); inmates have input in prison  
policies; there is limited violence; and inmates are given individual 
cells (Christie, 2000; Pratt, 2008). Essentially, then, many  
Scandinavian inmates are working toward reentry after their  
admission to prison, whereas in the United States, inmate reentry is 
just beginning to gain serious traction.38  
                                                     
 33. GROWTH OF INCARCERATION, supra note 2, at 2. 
 34. Id. at 267. 
 35. Id. at 270. 
 36. Id. at 247. One study estimated the earnings reduction to be as high as forty percent. Bruce 
Western & Becky Pettit, Incarceration & Social Inequality, 139 DAEDALUS 13 (2010). 
 37. Peter Wagner & Alison Walsh, States of Incarceration: The Global Context 2016, PRISON 
POL’Y INITIATIVE (June 16, 2016), http://www.prisonpolicy.org/global/2016.html 
[https://perma.cc/EQ39-DCS3]. 
 38. Matthew DeMichele, Electronic Monitoring: It Is a Tool, Not a Silver Bullet, 13 
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 393, 394–95 (2014). 
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Moreover, conjugal relations are encouraged, and most prisons  
provide accommodation where the partners and children of inmates can 
stay without charge for weekends.39 
The exemplar of the nonpunitive, integrative approach to  
imprisonment is Halden Prison in Norway, which houses maximum  
security prisoners. Each cell has unbarred windows and designer  
furniture.40 Guards are not armed and prison conditions are maintained 
with the assistance of questionnaires completed by inmates regarding 
their experience in prison and what can be done to improve it.41 The 
same approach applies in Finland. The Finnish Sentences Enforcement 
Act of 2002 states: “punishment is a mere loss of liberty. The  
enforcement of the sentence must be organised so that the sentence is the 
only loss of liberty. Other restrictions can be used to the extent that the 
security of custody and the prison order require.”42 The approach of  
making the prison experience as close as possible to the outside  
environment is achieving outstanding results, with recidivism levels of 
prisoners after they are released as low as 20%.43 This compares to a  
recidivism rate in the U.S. of approximately 50%.44 
In theory, the U.S. could move towards less harsh prison  
conditions. However, the reality is that any such change would take  
decades to evolve. The current trend in the U.S. is towards increasingly 
harsh prison conditions, which are consistent with the punitive approach 
to criminal sentencing.45 
The greatest single change to the prison landscape in the U.S. over 
the past two decades, apart from the massive increase in the size of the 
industry, has been the emergence and growth of “super-maximum  
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[security]” or “super-max” prisons.46 These facilities normally consist of 
“jails within prisons.”47 There is no uniformity to such conditions, but in 
general they involve “incarcerating inmates under highly isolated  
conditions with severely limited access to programs, exercise, staff or 
other inmates.”48 
One of the first super-maximum prisons was the “rock fortress,” 
Alcatraz, in San Francisco Bay, which was operated by the U.S. Federal 
Bureau of Prisons from 1934 until its closure in 1963.49 The number of 
such facilities has grown rapidly since that time. More than forty U.S. 
states now have super-maximum prisons.50 These prisons, or units within 
prisons, house at least 25,000 prisoners.51 
Unlike regular prison, there is no consistency regarding the exact 
daily regimes of super-max prisoners, but it can include being locked in a 
cell for up to 23 hours per day.52 When prisoners are out of their cells 
they move to what is, in effect, no more than another (larger) cell where 
they normally have contact with no more than one other prisoner.53  
Inmates often do not have access to fresh air, direct sunlight, or  
educational facilities, and have limited visiting rights and access to 
communications facilities.54 In some circumstances, the regime is less 
restrictive but it always involves being warehoused in a concrete room 
and the time spent out of a cell is, in effect, spent in a slightly larger  
concrete cell. 
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Super-maximum prisons are not only considerably more physically 
onerous than normal prisons, but there is also significant evidence  
establishing that they cause psychological damage to inmates. A  
relatively recent report by Amnesty International notes, 
There is a significant body of evidence that confining individuals in 
isolated conditions, even for relatively short periods of time, can 
cause serious psychological and sometimes physiological harm, 
with symptoms including anxiety and depression, insomnia,  
hypertension, extreme paranoia, perceptual distortions and  
psychosis. This damaging effect can be immediate and increases the 
longer the measure lasts and the more indeterminate it is. Isolation 
has been found to have negative effects on individuals with no  
pre-existing illness and to be particularly harmful in the case of 
those who already suffer from mental illness.55  
Thus, while the human rights concerns associated with prison  
conditions in the U.S. are theoretically surmountable, pragmatically, it is 
unlikely that prison conditions will improve in the foreseeable future. It 
is clear that imprisonment has two key disadvantages: cost and  
punitiveness. The rest of this Article attempts to find solutions in order to 
ameliorate the extent of these problems. 
II. DOCTRINAL FRAMEWORK FOR DEVELOPING  
NEW CRIMINAL SANCTIONS 
A. Punishment: The Infliction of a Hardship 
In order to advance (as opposed to merely change) the current  
response to criminal behaviour, it is important to develop a doctrinal 
framework for developing criminal sanctions. Logically, this commences 
with an understanding of the nature and objectives of criminal sanctions. 
At the most basal level, sentencing involves the imposition of  
punishment. A number of definitions of punishment have been advanced. 
Professor Andrew von Hirsch, Director of Centre for Penal Theory & 
Penal Ethics, believes that “[p]unishing someone consists of doing  
something painful or unpleasant to him, because he has purportedly 
committed a wrong.”56 Professor C.L. Ten, from the National University 
of Singapore, finds that “[p]unishment involves the infliction of some 
unpleasantness on the offender, or it deprives the offender of something 
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valued.”57 McTaggart, a former philosopher from Cambridge University, 
defines punishment as “the infliction of pain on a person because he has 
done wrong.”58 Other scholars, in defining punishment, have placed 
more emphasis on the hurt that punishment seeks to bring about. 
Most pointedly, punishment has been described as pain delivery.59 
Nigel Walker, a former Professor of Criminology at Cambridge  
University, is more expansive in his definition regarding the type of 
treatment that can constitute punishment. According to him, punishment 
involves “the infliction of something which is assumed to be unwelcome 
to the recipient: the inconvenience of a disqualification, the hardship of 
incarceration, the suffering of a flogging, exclusion from the country or 
community, or in extreme cases death.”60 
The common thread that emerges from these definitions is that  
punishment is a hardship or deprivation, the taking away of something of 
value for a wrong that has been committed. Thus, punishment necessarily 
involves the infliction of some inconvenience or hardship on an offender. 
The concept of hardship comes in degrees. Not all pain or hardship is 
equivalent and the intensity can vary considerably. This is reflected in 
the fact that most jurisdictions have a hierarchy of sanctions, which in 
crude terms (in increasing severity) ranges from a fine to parole, with 
imprisonment being the harshest disposition.61 
It is on the basis of this first criterion that imprisonment is an ideal 
sanction: we can be almost certain that it will inflict pain. “The loss of 
freedom imposed upon a prisoner deprives him or her of a finite  
resource, namely time. . . . Death is a certainty for everyone, and it can 
therefore be argued that all prisoners must inevitably experience an  
irreplaceable loss of time.”62 
In order for criminal sanctions to hurt in each instance, they should 
be designed to target the most widely coveted human interests. Due to 
the diversity of human nature, there is no guarantee that any type of 
criminal sanction will bite in every case; even prison does not harm all 
people.63 For many people, prison deprives them of much that is  
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meaningful in life—it cuts them off from their friends and family and 
prevents them from pursuing projects that give their lives purpose and 
enjoyment. For a small portion of offenders, however, prison is merely a 
hiccup in a generally aimless life. Anomalies of this nature do not  
prevent there being better and worse assessments concerning the  
pervasiveness and depth of common human interests. 
B. Punishment Should Also Be Efficient and  
Not Violate Important Moral Limits 
Apart from being effective in delivering pain, there are two other 
important guiding principles that are relevant in formulating criminal 
sanctions. First, criminal sanctions should be as economical as possible 
to administer, monitor, and enforce. From the financial perspective, it is 
important that the response to crime should not be more damaging than 
the crime itself. It is self-defeating to develop and implement sanctions 
that are prohibitively expensive. The absence of an accepted precise 
methodology for ascribing a dollar amount to crime64 does not provide a 
basis for excluding the imposition on public finances in assessing the 
desirability of reforms to the criminal justice system. 
The last criterion in developing criminal sanctions is that it is  
important they do not violate cardinal moral proscriptions. There is, of 
course, a considerable degree of uncertainty regarding the exact content 
of moral principles.65 However, there are some basal norms that have 
evolved. To this end, important moral prohibitions apply equally to  
offenders as other members of the community. The manner in which  
society treats offenders says as much about the standards of the commu-
nity as it does about the criminals it is punishing: “a society that fails to 
deal with cruelty will probably also need to develop mechanisms to  
desensitize itself to suffering. In so doing, it will diminish itself.”66 
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It follows that two potentially effective and efficient forms of  
punishment are excluded. The first is corporal punishment.67 The  
deliberate infliction of pain to the body should no longer be a form of 
punishment. The abolition of corporal punishment has been instrumental 
to the supposed “civilisation” of punishment.68 Inflicting a hardship on 
members of an offender’s family could also constitute an efficient and 
potentially effective means of punishment; however, this is intolerable 
given the proscription against punishing the innocent.69 These moral  
proscriptions are both likely to be reflected in the constitutional  
prohibition against “cruel and unusual” punishment in the Eighth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, although the matters have not been 
directly litigated.70 
In light of the above exclusions, the starting point in developing 
criminal sanctions is to identify which interests most people highly  
value. The severity of a sanction can then be determined by evaluating 
“how much [the] sanction intrudes upon the interests a person typically 
needs to live a [happy] life.”71 It is clear that two highly coveted interests 
are physical integrity and liberty—these interests are recognised in most 
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moral codes.72 Other important interests can be identified by reference to 
activities to which people commonly and frequently devote their time 
and resources. It follows that other important interests are (not  
necessarily in this order): (i) relationships with family and friends, (ii) 
financial wealth, (iii) work, and (iv) education. 
As noted above, it is inappropriate to target the family and friends 
of offenders in imposing criminal sanctions. Prisons already target  
liberty, while fines target the financial assets of offenders. We will now 
argue that liberty should be curtailed in ways other than imprisonment 
and that criminal sanctions should be developed that would limit the 
work and educational pursuits of offenders. 
III. NEW FORMS OF SANCTIONS 
A. Opening the Prison Gates: Introducing the Criminal  
Justice System to Technology 
As noted above, the main benefit of prison is that it imposes an  
almost total constraint on the liberty of the offender and hence ensures 
that the offender cannot again damage the community by reoffending 
during the term of imprisonment. The confinement and containment  
process can now be effectively achieved by far less expensive means. 
The key to this is the more effective and frequent use of  
round-the-clock monitored electronic bracelets, which can be  
supplemented by a global position system (GPS) and close-circuit  
television (CCTV) surveillance. This is known as electronic monitoring 
(EM). 
 Reports indicate that more than 100,000 people are under EM in 
the U.S.73 EM, which originated in the U.S. in the early 1980s, is used in 
a number of countries, including the United Kingdom.74 However,  
problems have reduced the enthusiasm for electronic tagging in the  
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United Kingdom. Some estimates put the number of offenders on some 
form of electronic tagging in the U.K. at 180,000.75 
The massive growth in use of EM is owed largely to the fact that it 
offers significant economic advantages over jail because the device itself 
costs far less than the cost of building a prison cell, and the ongoing 
monitoring costs are lower than the operating costs of jail.76 The  
potential for cost savings ranges from six to ten times when compared to 
the alternatives. Therefore, when applied to hundreds of thousands of 
offenders, the potential savings for the system could be in the billions of 
dollars. 
In the U.K., EM is primarily done via radio devices, and GPS is 
used only for terrorism related offenders. In relation to GPS, the subject 
is monitored 24/7 by satellites receiving transmitted information which is 
then triangulated to provide data on location and movement. When the 
subject enters a forbidden territory or leaves a geographic limit, the  
surveillance officers and the offender are alerted via an alarm. If the  
offender does not take corrective action, the authorities can order  
intervention in order to bring him into conformity. The key advantage of 
EM is its flexibility and adaptability to the profile of the individual  
offender. For instance, the exclusion zones for child sex offenders would 
include schools, playgrounds, and shopping malls, whereas a domestic 
violence offender might only be excluded from the premises of his 
spouse or other victim. Offenders under EM might also be required to 
check in regularly with authorities.77 
Some forms of EM are passive in the sense that a computer or other 
device makes calls to the prisoner at random times to check in but  
otherwise leaves him alone, whereas others are active and entail 24/7 
monitoring of movement via satellite. Regardless of the form employed, 
the objective of EM is to transfer confinement from a costly limited 
space owned and managed by the state to one under the limited control 
of the offender. It is widely used in pre-trial and post-release situations, 
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and we advocate for its greater use for nonviolent and nonsexual  
offenders in lieu of custodial sentences. 
Similarly, GPS tracking has received increasing attention in recent 
years particularly in light of highly publicised sexual offences involving 
children. One important advancement is the adoption of Jessica’s Law in 
many states in the U.S. The law is named after Jessica Lunsford, a  
nine-year-old Floridian child who was raped and murdered by a  
neighbour with a record of crimes against children who lived across from 
her house. A recent survey showed that thirty-nine states have adopted 
some version of the law requiring GPS or EM of sex offenders.78 Thus, it 
is clear that EM is very much a tool in the modern correctional landscape 
for certain kinds of offenders. 
In relation to offences which are relatively serious but do not  
necessarily require a prison term (for example, low level violent  
offences), the offender could be restricted to a relatively small area (for 
example his or her home and outside yard area), and EM could be  
coupled with around-the-clock CCTV surveillance.79 This would not  
only provide a surer basis for knowing the whereabouts of the offender at 
every point in time, but would also constitute a harsher form of  
punishment given the incursion into personal privacy. 
Studies indicate that active electronic monitoring supplemented by 
GPS technology reduces recidivism.80 For example, a study of recidivism 
rates of Argentinian offenders comparing those who had been jailed  
versus those who had been tagged with EM showed that the former’s 
recidivism rate was 22% compared to 13% for the latter.81 An important 
study of 516 sex offenders in California showed that parole revocation 
and recidivism were 38% higher for those on traditional parole when 
compared with those under GPS monitoring.82 Notably, the study only 
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covered high-risk sex offenders on parole and found that GPS monitoring 
was actually more expensive in these circumstances than traditional  
parole supervision.83 Another study of high-risk gang offenders  
monitored by GPS in California conducted over a two year period found 
that the number of arrests both for general offences and violent offences 
were lower for those under GPS monitoring.84 However, these offenders 
were more likely to be in violation of their parole both in technical and 
nontechnical terms. Moreover, GPS monitoring costs $21.20/parolee/day 
whereas the traditional method (in the form of regular meetings with a 
parole officer) only costs $7.20/parolee/day.85 
Another study to have undertaken cost–benefit analyses of EM  
programs was conducted by the District of Columbia Crime Policy  
Institute. Investigators conducted a review of prior research comparing 
EM to probation and found that EM results in a reduction in the average 
number of arrests per participant, yielding a societal benefit of $3,800 
per participant.86 The study estimated a net social benefit of between 
$4,600 and $4,800 per person for EM programs serving 800 people.87 
Our proposal for increased deployment of EM (especially when  
accompanied by CCTV monitoring) as a sanction in lieu of jail will  
encounter objections. First, attaching an EM device and subjecting an 
offender to constant surveillance entails an infringement of privacy. This 
type of objection is likely to be advanced in conjunction with familiar 
critiques about the expansion of the surveillance state. However, the  
criticism is without substance in this context because offenders have little 
or no privacy in prison. Surveillance is constant and prison conditions 
mean that the offender is likely to be sharing space at all times with other 
inmates or guards who have the ability to observe him. Therefore,  
electronic surveillance does not represent an invasion of privacy beyond 
what is already accepted in the alternative of imprisonment. Moreover, 
privacy is a dynamic concept that is constantly evolving, and the  
expectations of privacy held by prisoners is conditioned by their  
experiences of the alternatives, meaning that as these devices become 
more common, the idea of less privacy becomes less objectionable.88  
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Besides, the state has a strong legitimate interest in monitoring  
individuals deemed dangerous to society and a legal challenge is unlikely 
to be successful.89 
Second, increased deployment of EM might be attacked as a  
violation of the ex post facto clause of the Constitution.90 As Justice 
Chase wrote in Calder v. Bull, 
The prohibition against their making any ex post facto laws was  
introduced for greater caution, and very probably arose from the 
knowledge, that the Parliament of Great Britain claimed and  
exercised a power to pass such laws. . . . [In some] cases, they  
inflicted greater punishment, than the law annexed to the offence. 
The ground for the exercise of such legislative power was this, that 
the safety of the kingdom depended on the death, or other  
punishment, of the offender: as if traitors, when discovered, could 
be so formidable, or the government so insecure! With very few  
exceptions, the advocates of such laws were stimulated by ambition, 
or personal resentment, and vindictive malice.91  
Justice Chase sought to define what constituted an ex post facto law 
and ruled that “[e]very law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a 
greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when  
committed”92 fell into that category. 
To that end, the Supreme Court laid down a test to determine when 
a sanction is to be regarded as punitive in Kennedy v.  
Mendoza-Martinez.93 The apex tribunal ruled that courts have to consider 
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, 
whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether 
it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its  
operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment—
retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies 
is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may 
rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears 
excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned[.]94  
Under this standard, it is clear that GPS devices are not an  
affirmative disability or restraint because it merely involves a small tag 
attached to the body of a person. Also, the attachment of a device has not 
been historically regarded as a punishment not just because it is a new 
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technology, but also because its relative inconspicuousness does not  
subject the offender to stigma.95 Further, to the extent that the GPS  
monitoring continues to subject the offender to disability or restraint, as 
recognized by the Supreme Court in Smith v. Doe, a case concerning sex 
offender registration requirements, “these consequences flow not from 
the Act’s registration and dissemination provisions, but from the fact of 
conviction, already a matter of public record.”96 Additionally, the  
employment of GPS tracking protects both the community and the  
individual, and the behavior it is seeking to protect against is a crime. 
Moreover, aside from deterrence, the alternative justifications—
protection of the offender from further harm and public safety—are  
reasonable based on the evidence of recidivism, which has been  
recognized as an acceptable regulatory objective.97 Finally, GPS  
monitoring is not excessive when weighed against the alternative,  
namely imprisonment.98 
The third objection that is likely to be addressed is that the  
technology is not foolproof and offenders might be able to remove or 
disable the device. Some studies have shown that the devices  
malfunctioned or did not transmit signals in inclement weather.99  
Moreover, some geographic locations might impose limitations on the 
technical abilities of the devices. Nonetheless, technology continues to 
improve and despite its limitations the competing alternative—
imprisonment—also has serious deficiencies. 
There are a number of issues that have been raised, some of which 
have resulted in a decline in the recent use of EM. Lars Andersen and 
Signe Andersen summarise key problems as follows: 
First, the money saved on imprisonment thanks to the use of  
electronic monitoring was now spent on testing and supervising the 
electronically monitored people (e.g., alcohol tests). Second,  
electronic monitoring and other noncustodial alternatives to  
imprisonment tended to widen the punitive system by putting more 
people under the purview of the criminal justice system. Third, the 
more intensive testing and supervision increased detection rates for 
recidivism and technical violations, which in turn sent even more 
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people into custody. This led some policy makers to view electronic 
monitoring and other noncustodial alternatives to imprisonment as 
failed social experiments, and the popularity of these programs  
faded in the United States.100  
These potential problems can be easily circumvented in the context 
of our proposal. There is imperative to spend considerable resources  
testing prisoners for drug and alcohol use. The criticism that  
implementing monitoring sanctions more frequently will result in the 
criminal justice system becoming more punitive is without merit. Critics 
may claim that EM would result in the placing of more people under the 
purview of the criminal justice system. However, this can be debunked 
by ensuring that the sanction is only imposed in circumstances where the 
offender would otherwise have been sentenced to imprisonment. Further, 
EM orders should not necessarily result in more testing and thus frequent 
imprisonment as a result of breaches resulting from testing, which often 
has no productive basis. 
Despite the advantages of EM devices (with or without CCTV), it is 
not contended that its use and implementation should result in the  
emptying of prisons. While EM can restrain the activities of all prisoners, 
some offences are too serious for any sanction other than imprisonment. 
Any new sanctions must give deference to fundamental aspects of  
sentencing. And to this end, a foundational requirement is the  
proportionality principle, which, in its crudest form, is the view that “the 
punishment should fit the crime.”101 
The proportionality principle is more fully set out by the High 
Court in Australia in Hoare v The Queen.102 The Court found that “a 
basic principle of sentencing law is that a sentence of imprisonment  
imposed by a court should never exceed that which can be justified as 
appropriate or proportionate to the gravity of the crime considered in the 
light of its objective circumstances.”103 Proportionality is a requirement 
of the sentencing regimes of ten states in the U.S.104 The precise  
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considerations that inform the proportionality principle vary in those  
jurisdictions, but generally there are six relevant criteria: 
1. Whether the penalty shocks a reasonable sense of decency; 
2. The gravity of the crime; 
3. The prior criminal history of the offender; 
4. The legislative objective relating to the sanction; 
5. A comparison of the sanction imposed on the accused with the 
penalty that would be imposed in other jurisdictions; and 
6. A comparison of the sanction with other penalties for similar 
and related offences in the same jurisdiction.105 
In addition to this, a survey of state sentencing law by E. Thomas 
Sullivan and Richard S. Frase shows that at least nine U.S. states have 
constitutional provisions relating to the prohibition of excessive penalties 
or treatment106 and twenty‐two states have constitutional clauses that 
prohibit cruel and unusual penalties, including eight states with a  
proportionate‐penalty clause.107 
Broken down to its core features, logically, proportionality has two 
limbs. The first is the seriousness of the crime and the second is the 
harshness of the sanction. Further, the principle has a quantitative  
component—the two limbs must be matched. In order for the principle to 
be satisfied, the seriousness of the crime must be equal to the harshness 
of the penalty. 
Some commentators have argued that proportionality is so vague as 
to be meaningless, in light of the fact that there is no stable and clear 
manner in which the punishment can be matched to the crime. Jesper 
Ryberg notes that one of the key, most damaging criticisms of  
proportionality is that it “presupposes something which is not there, 
namely, some objective measure of appropriateness between crime and 
punishment.”108 The most obscure and unsatisfactory aspect of  
proportionality is that there is no stable and clear manner in which the 
punishment can be matched to the crime. Ryberg further notes that to 
give content to the theory, it is necessary to rank crimes, rank  
punishments, and anchor the scales.109 
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There is some merit in Ryberg’s critique. And as noted by Ian 
Leader-Elliott and George Fletcher, the application of the proportionality 
principle is especially difficult in the case of offences, such as drug  
offences, where there is no direct, clear, and observable harm caused by 
the crime: 
The ruling principle of proportionality applies to offenders who  
traffic in drugs no less than it does to offenders who inflict injury or 
death. In the trafficking offences, however, there is not the same  
intuitive, retributive ground for determining a punishment to fit the 
offence. There is no natural measure of proportionality in offences 
that are supposed to secure the common good. The American  
theorist George Fletcher makes the point in his discussion of crimes 
of lese majeste: 
Just punishment requires a sense of proportion, which in 
turn requires sensitivity to the injury inflicted. . . . The 
more the victim suffers, the more pain should be inflicted 
on the criminal. In the context of betrayal, the gears of this 
basic principle of justice, the lex talionis, fail to engage the 
problem. The theory of punishment does not mesh with the 
crime when there is no tangible harm, no friction against 
the physical welfare of the victim.110  
While doctrinally it has been argued that there is a manner in which 
firmer content could be accorded to the proportionality doctrine,111 an 
exact matching of offence severity and penalty harshness is not feasible 
in light of the current understanding of proportionalism. 
However, this is not an issue that needs to be settled and resolved 
for the purposes of this Article. Irrespective of the precise manner in 
which harmfulness is assessed, it is clear that a cardinal criterion is the 
extent to which it sets back the interests and welfare of victims.  
Accordingly, homicide offences are the most serious. This is followed by 
other crimes against the person. Studies show victims of violent and  
sexual crime have their well-being more significantly set back than other 
types of crime. For example, a review of the existing literature regarding 
the effects of violent and sexual crimes on key quality of life indices112 
demonstrated that many victims suffered considerably across a range of 
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well-being indicia, well after the physical signs had passed.113 The report 
concluded: 
In sum, findings from the well-established literature on general 
trauma and the emerging research on crime victimization indicate 
significant functional impact on the quality of life for victims.  
However, more research is necessary to understand the mechanisms 
of these relationships and differences among types of crime  
victimization, gender, and racial/ethnic groups.114  
Findings showed that victims of violent and sexual crimes in  
particular have diminished parenting skills;115 difficulty in being  
involved in intimate relationships and higher divorce rates;116 higher  
levels of unemployment;117 and less engagement and participation in  
social and leisure activities.118 A United Kingdom study showed that  
victims of sexual and violent crimes were 2.6 times more likely to suffer 
from depression than other individuals,119 and one in twenty women who 
had been seriously sexually assaulted attempted suicide.120 
Another study examined the effects of either violent or property 
crime on the health of 2,430 respondents.121 Lead author Chester L. Britt 
noted, “Victims of violent crime reported lower levels of perceived 
health and physical well being, controlling for measures of injury and for 
socio demographic characteristics.”122 Further, these findings were not 
confined to violent crime. Victims of property crime also reported  
reduced levels of perceived well-being, but it was less profound than in 
the case of violent crime.123 
Given the damage inflicted by serious violent and sexual offences, 
there is a sound argument that imprisonment is the only proportionate 
response to these offences. Any softer sanction would fail to reflect the 
gravity of such offences. Accordingly, we do not propose that the new 
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sanctions should be targeted at such offending. This, however, does not 
undermine the enormous utility of our proposal. Approximately half of 
the offenders in U.S. state and federal prisons are not detained for sexual 
or violent offences and hence could potentially be dealt with by way of 
the alternative sanctions proposed in this Article, constituting a saving of 
billions of dollars in misspent prison expenditures.124 
B. Targeting Other Important Human Interests:  
Employment and Education Sanctions 
The increased use of monitoring devices is an illustration of  
technology positively shaping the development of the criminal justice 
system. However, potential improvements in this domain are not totally 
reliant on scientific advancements. Different theoretical perspectives can 
have similar outcomes. To this end, it is proposed that a fresh and  
wide-ranging approach to the nature of criminal punishment and core 
human interests supports the establishment of a number of new criminal 
sanctions, namely the “employment sanction” and the “education  
sanction.”125 
Many people spend an enormous amount of time, energy, and  
resources obtaining an education and working. The widespread nature 
and intensity of the desires to obtain an education and career makes these 
interests prime targets for inflicting hardships on offenders. We now  
outline how the proposed sanctions could operate. 
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1. The Features of the Employment Sanction 
The employment sanction would consist of an order prohibiting an 
offender from engaging in employment where the offender derives  
income in excess of that which is necessary to provide for the necessities 
of life for a defined period. In pragmatic terms, this means that for the 
duration of the sanction the offender would not be permitted to earn an 
income in excess of the level of poverty.126 
This could constitute a considerable unpleasantness to potentially a 
large number of people. Currently, there are approximately 253 million 
Americans in the adult civilian (noninstitutional) population.127 More 
than 158 million of this population has employment.128 Approximately 
94 million are not in the labor force (for example, because they are  
caring for children or are retired).129 There are 7.9 million people, about 
five percent of the adult population, who are unemployed.130 
The inability to derive a meaningful income would obviously set 
back the economic and financial interests of offenders. It would also  
curtail the freedom that is associated with financial wealth. Thus,  
offenders would be limited in their spending options and experience a 
greatly diminished capacity to, for example, travel and socialise. 
In addition to this, for many people the deprivation associated with 
the employment sanction would go beyond that associated with having 
no or little income. This is because many individuals, at least in part,  
define themselves by their jobs. “Humans realize themselves through 
activity, and though that activity need not be work, productive work  
activity represents one of the major ways in which we break the bonds of 
solipsistic subjectivity and are able to influence the world beyond us.”131 
The association between work, identity, and flourishing is  
supported by empirical studies into human well-being, which establish 
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that the more challenged a person is—whether by a job, hobby, or 
sport—the happier he or she is likely to be.132 
In order for the employment sanction to be effective, it is important 
that it be monitored and enforced relatively efficiently. In order for this 
to occur, existing government systems that are used to track and identify 
individuals should be used to record the existence of any work sanction. 
For example, each American citizen and permanent resident has a unique 
social security number, which is used not only for social security  
payments but also for taxation identification and payment purposes.133 
These details must be provided to prospective employers in order for an 
employer to deduct the appropriate amount of taxation and pay the  
employee.134 It would be a relatively simple measure for court orders 
relating to employment sanctions to be linked to an individual’s social 
security number. In this way a “clean” social security number would 
serve as a “licence” to work and earn income above the designated  
income threshold. 
2. The Features of the Education Sanction 
Education is a highly desired commodity. Not only does it  
empower and enable people to make better and more informed choices 
and decisions, but it also provides people with the credentials that are a 
threshold requirement for a range of jobs and professions. The  
importance and value that people place on obtaining an education is  
illustrated by the high number of people in the United States with a  
formal education and the number currently progressing toward that goal. 
It is also shown through the lengths that people go to in order to secure 
an education. 
Currently, there are more than 20 million Americans attending 
American colleges and universities.135 Further, there are approximately 
70 million Americans with a bachelor’s (or higher) degree.136 The cost of 
undertaking a bachelor’s degree in the United States can readily exceed 
$10,000 in tuition fees alone.137 Despite such fees, most people have a 
                                                     
 132. See M. Bagaric & J. McConvill, Goodbye Justice, Hello Happiness: Welcoming Positive 
Psychology to the Law, 10 DEAKIN L. REV. 1 (2005) (Austl.). 
 133. 26 U.S.C. § 6109 (2012). 
 134. Form W-4, Employee’s Withholding Allowance Certificate, IRS, 
https://www.irs.gov/uac/About-Form-W4 [https://perma.cc/9WCU-YH4X]. 
 135. Fast Facts: Back to School Statistics, NAT’L CENTRE FOR EDUC. STAT., 
http://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=372 [https://perma.cc/MV4T-XE3J]. 
 136. Educational Attainment in the United States: 2014 - Detailed Table, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/hhes/socdemo/education/data/cps/2014/tables.html [https://perma. 
cc/E98J-XEEF]. 
 137. Fast Facts: Tuition Costs of Colleges and Universities, NAT’L CENTER FOR EDUC. STAT., 
https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=76 [https://perma.cc/9YCR-K9KY]; see also Laura 
86 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 40:57 
strong desire to attain a formal education, with demand greatly  
outstripping the availability of places in many programs. Thus, there is 
no question that limiting the utility of people’s educational achievements 
would considerably set back their interests. 
The education sanction would come in two, broad forms. The  
milder form of the sanction would prohibit people from enrolling in or 
continuing with any course in which they are enrolled for the duration of 
the court order.138 The harsher version of the sanction would be  
applicable to people with a formal college, university, trade, or other  
degree or certificate. It would operate in two ways. Most commonly, it 
would suspend the work privileges that are associated with the  
qualification or credential for a designated period. This would mean that 
for the period of disqualification, the offender could not work in any 
field where a formal qualification of the relevant type was necessary. In 
its most punitive form, the sanction would operate to permanently void 
the qualification, thereby forever depriving the offender of the pragmatic 
functionality of his or her education. 
As with the employment sanction, it is important to ensure that any 
compliance and monitoring costs associated with the education sanction 
are minimal. There are a number of ways in which educational  
deprivations could be recorded and promulgated. One measure would be 
to simply record them as part of the information contained with an  
individual’s social security number and IRS details. Alternatively, an 
“Education Termination and Suspension” (or similar) register could be 
established, which would keep records of all people disqualified from 
study and of any suspensions or disqualification of credentials. The  
information should be publicly available so that it could be accessed by 
educational institutes and prospective employers. 
Some aspects of the education (and employment) sanction are  
already effectively imposed in some jurisdictions. Many professional 
bodies have a process whereby members who are convicted of criminal 
offences risk losing their licence to practice—for example, the medical 
and legal professions. The advantage of the education sanction, however, 
is that it makes this process more wide-ranging and integrated. 
                                                                                                                       
Bridgestock, How Much Does it Cost to Study in the US?, TOPUNIVERSITIES (Jan. 30, 2015, 12:00 
AM), http://www.topuniversities.com/student-info/student-finance/how-much-does-it-cost-study-us 
[https://perma.cc/GQC6-RS5F]. 
 138. For reasons discussed below, this sanction should only be imposed where EM and the 
employment sanction are not appropriate. 
2016] Progressive Alternatives to Imprisonment 87 
C. The Circumstances in Which the Sanctions Are Appropriate 
The circumstances in which the new sanctions should be imposed 
can be summarised as follows: The new sanctions should be available as 
a sentencing option in all cases where a term of imprisonment would 
otherwise be imposed, except where one of the following two  
preconditions applies:  
(a) The offence is such that only a jail term is commensurate with the 
gravity of the crime; or 
(b) The personal circumstances of the offender are such that neither an 
employment deprivation nor an education suspension or cancellation 
will inconvenience him or her.  
We will now expand further on each of these considerations. 
The first consideration involves gauging the severity of the  
respective sanctions. This principally turns on the extent to which the 
interests of the offender would be frustrated or set back as a result of  
being subjected to the sanctions.139 There is no clear answer to this given 
the diversity of human preferences and activities. However, in light of 
the considerable time, energy, and resources that people spend pursuing 
educational and vocational pursuits, it is clear that these interests are 
generally highly coveted. It follows then that the deprivation of or  
interference with these interests would constitute significant  
unpleasantness to most people. 
In crude terms, the hardship resulting from having one’s degree 
cancelled would be similar to a term of imprisonment of about the same 
length that it took to acquire the degree. Thus, cancellation of a  
three-year law degree would have a similar negative impact on a person 
as a three-year jail term. As we have seen, the pains of imprisonment 
often extend beyond the time an offender spends behind bars, but so too 
would the deprivation associated with an annulment of a formal  
educational qualification. Such a sanction would not only largely negate 
the utility of past endeavours but also deny the offender the future benefit 
of the qualification, which in many cases may relate to a period of  
several decades. 
Suspending one’s educational qualification does not totally deny an 
offender the utility of the qualification, given that the qualification shall 
return after the disqualification period has lapsed, and hence it is not  
tenable to rate this as equivalent to the hardship stemming from the  
cancellation of an educational sanction. Accordingly, it is proposed that 
suspending one’s educational qualifications is half as burdensome as  
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annulling the qualification. Relatively speaking, disqualifying an  
offender from participating in a formal course of education is less  
burdensome than either cancelling or suspending an educational  
qualification. Being enrolled in an educational program provides the  
student with an opportunity to attain the relevant credential. Denial of 
this opportunity should be regarded as being approximately half the  
deprivation stemming from suspension of a qualification. 
The employment sanction is not as harsh as the education sanction 
because the employment sanction only impacts the future aspirations of 
an offender. Despite this, it would still constitute considerable  
unpleasantness for most people based on the fact that it deprives them of 
the capacity to earn a meaningful amount of income and the ability to 
fully explore and develop their workplace potential. Given that most  
individuals who have the opportunity to work spend about half of their 
productive time (not including weekends) doing so,140 the employment 
sanction is approximately half as severe as imprisonment. 
We now expand on precondition (a). As noted above, the principle 
of proportionality is the main determinant regarding the severity of  
criminal punishment, and it is necessary to match this with the harm 
caused by the offence. As we saw, empirical evidence establishes that 
sexual and violent crimes inflict the most harm to victims. The damage 
caused by serious offences of this nature is often so profound and  
enduring that imprisonment is the only appropriate response. However, 
as is the case with EM (with or without CCTV), there is no basis for  
asserting that other offences cannot be dealt with by alternative  
sanctions, including the proposed employment and education sanctions. 
At first glance, it may appear that the proportion of offenders who 
are suitable candidates for the education sanction is limited, given that 
many people appearing before the criminal courts have no formal  
educational. The National Research Council recognised that “[one-third 
of] white male high school dropouts born in the late 1970s . . . are  
estimated to have served time in prison by their mid-30s. . . . [A]mong 
black male high school dropouts, about two-thirds have a prison record 
by that same age.”141 Notably, the correlation between low educational 
attainment and incarceration is very high for racial minorities: “African 
American men born since the late 1960s are more likely to have served 
time in prison than to have completed college with a 4-year degree.”142 
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However, at least ten percent of prisoners have postsecondary  
education.143 
Further, people are disadvantaged not only by the denial of a  
concrete commodity, but also by the denial of the opportunity to pursue 
and explore their preferences and projects. It is largely for this reason 
that formal barriers to access, by certain groups, of social goods and  
services is unacceptable. Although there are often disparities along  
racial, ethnic, and gender lines in terms of enrollment in educational 
courses (and employment in elite professions), communities are often 
willing to tolerate these disparities provided that there are no formal  
barriers to minority and disadvantaged groups participating in such  
practices. 
Opportunity or potential—though neither may ever be realised—are 
desirable virtues. This observation is especially appropriate in relation to 
the employment sanction. Few people have no desire to engage in  
employment that will provide them with a meaningful level of income. 
Therefore, even offenders who are not employed at the time of  
sentencing are likely to be harmed by the imposition of a formal obstacle 
to securing meaningful employment. Thus, the employment sanction is 
suitable even for the unemployed. However, offenders who are employed 
at the time of sentencing suffer a greater hardship than those who are 
unemployed. The additional hardship stemming from loss of an existing 
job could be accommodated by a deduction, of twenty percent for  
example, from the length of the employment sanction. 
The education sanction is obviously relevant to all offenders with a 
formal qualification and to those enrolled in an educational program. 
Moreover, it would also be potentially suitable to offenders who are  
relatively young and presumably aspirational and ambitious. By contrast, 
the sanction is not likely to cause any pain to an offender who has not 
enrolled in a course of education for, say, more than twenty years and 
has displayed no genuine interest in ever doing so. Offenders with such a 
profile would not be suitable for the education sanction, and the more 
appropriate alternative sanction would either be the employment sanction 
or EM monitoring.144 
In summary, the main interests that are targeted by criminal  
sanctions are liberty and financial wealth. These do not fully encompass 
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the important areas of human concern or endeavour. People, through 
their conduct, demonstrate that they have a strong desire to attain  
educational qualifications and to work. These interests should also be 
targeted by criminal sanctions. Key advantages with a reform of this  
nature are that (i) monitoring and enforcement costs are relatively low 
and (ii) the sanctions could provide an alternative to imprisonment in 
relation to all offence types, except serious sexual and violent offences. 
We now address possible objections to these proposed reforms. 
IV. PROPOSED REFORMS WILL NOT LEAD TO MORE CRIME 
The proposed new sanctions could be criticized on the basis that 
they may lead to more crime by undermining the goal of incapacitation, 
diluting the deterrent effect of criminal sanctions and diminishing the 
rehabilitative prospects of offenders. However, a close assessment of the 
goals of sentencing, the efficacy of the criminal justice system to achieve 
the orthodox objectives of sentencing, and a strategic approach to the 
applicability of the new sanctions (which is adapted in light of the  
appropriate and attainable objectives of sentencing) can surmount any 
possible unintended adverse consequences associated with implementing 
the proposed new sanctions. The discussion below focuses centrally on 
the employment and education sanction (given its novelty), but is also 
applicable to EM (with or without CCTV). 
General deterrence and incapacitation have been widely used to  
justify the move toward harsher criminal sanctions. The main reason for 
increased incarceration levels has been the imposition of longer  
sentences.145 Specific deterrence has been invoked to a lesser degree to 
justify the same objective. In exploring the impact of new sanctions on 
these objectives, the logical starting point is the efficacy of punishment 
to achieve these goals. If it transpires that criminal sanctions, and in  
particular imprisonment, cannot attain these goals, then it is untenable to 
argue against the new sanctions on the basis of frustration of existing 
sentencing aims. 
We now examine whether these objectives are achievable. There is 
a vast body of literature regarding these sentencing objectives, and these 
topics have been the subject of extensive recent analysis.146 The  
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discussion below summarizes the main studies in relation to each  
relevant sentencing objective and the current state of knowledge. This is 
made easier by the fact that there is a relatively clear consensus in  
regards to each of the areas. We start with the objectives in relation to 
which the evidence is most clear-cut. 
A. The Deterrence Objective Will Not Be Undermined 
1. Specific Deterrence Does Not Work 
Specific deterrence aims to reduce crime by punishing individual 
offenders for their crimes and thereby convincing them that crime does 
not pay. It attempts to deter offenders from reoffending by inflicting a 
hardship on them, which presumably they will seek to avoid in the  
future.147 However, the empirical data focusing on this theory suggests 
that it is flawed. It is a case of common sense being rebutted by research 
findings. 
There have been numerous studies across a wide range of  
jurisdictions and different time periods that reject the theory of specific 
deterrence.148 Two theorists149 observed the reoffending of 1,003  
offenders who were initially sentenced for drug-related offences between 
June 2002 and May 2003 by a number of different judges whose  
sentencing approaches varied significantly (some were described as  
“punitive,” others as “lenient”), resulting in differing terms of  
imprisonment and probation.150 The study concluded that neither the 
length of imprisonment nor the probation had an effect on the rate of 
reoffending during the four-year, follow-up period.151 
A different but extensive wide-ranging analysis of the relevant  
literature on specific deterrence was undertaken in 2009.152 The team 
                                                                                                                       
[hereinafter The Fallacy that is Incapacitation]; Mirko Bagaric & Theo Alexander, (Marginal)  
General Deterrence Doesn’t Work—And What it Means for Sentencing, 35 CRIM. L.J. 269 (2011). 
Most recently, one of us summarised the literature in Mirko Bagaric, The Punishment Should Fit the 
Crime–Not the Prior Convictions of the Person that Committed the Crime: An Argument for Less 
Impact Being Accorded to Previous Convictions in Sentencing, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 343 (2014) 
[hereinafter The Punishment Should Fit the Crime]. 
 147. The Capacity of Criminal Sanctions, supra note 146, at 159. 
 148. See The Capacity of Criminal Sanctions, supra note 146 for a review of the studies. 
 149. See Donald P. Green & Daniel Winik, Using Random Judge Assignments to Estimate the 
Effects of Incarceration and Probation on Recidivism Among Drug Offenders, 48 CRIMINOLOGY 
357, 357–58 (2010). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. See Daniel S. Nagin, Francis T. Cullen & Cheryl Lero Jonson, Imprisonment &  
Reoffending, 38 CRIME & JUST. 115, 145 (2009); see also Donald Ritchie, Does Imprisonment  
Deter? A Review of the Evidence, SENT’G ADVISORY COUNCIL (Apr. 18, 2011), 
https://www.sentencingcouncil.vic.gov.au/publications/does-imprisonment-deter 
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reviewed the impact of custodial sanctions versus noncustodial sanctions 
and the effect of sentence length on reoffending. The review examined 
six experimental studies where custodial versus noncustodial sentences 
were randomly assigned;153 eleven studies that involved matched pairs;154 
thirty-one studies that were regression based;155 and seven other studies 
that did not neatly fit into any of those three categories and included  
naturally occurring social experiments that allowed inferences to be 
drawn regarding the capacity of imprisonment to deter offenders. 
These theorists concluded that offenders who are sentenced to  
imprisonment do not have a lower rate of recidivism than those who  
receive a noncustodial penalty.156 In fact, some studies show the rate of 
recidivism among offenders sentenced to imprisonment to be higher.157 
This review concluded that: 
Taken as a whole, it is our judgment that the experimental studies 
point more toward a criminogenic [that is, the possible corrupting 
effects of punishment] rather than preventive effect of custodial 
sanctions. The evidence for this conclusion, however, is weak  
because it is based on only a small number of studies, and many of 
the point estimates are not statistically significant.158  
This is consistent with more recent analysis, which suggests an 
even stronger link between imprisonment and an increased risk of 
reoffending. A report published in 2016 that surveyed the data regarding 
the connection between incarcerations and recidivism notes: 
[A] growing body of work has found that incarceration increases  
recidivism. This research compares outcomes of defendants with 
similar characteristics and offenses and uses the random assignment 
of defendants to judges to predict a defendant’s assigned sentence, 
based only on the judge’s historical sentencing behavior. For  
instance, one recent study that uses highly detailed data from Texas 
uses this design and finds that although initial incarceration prevents 
crime through incapacitation, each additional sentence year causes 
an increase in future offending that eventually outweighs the  
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incapacitation benefit. Each additional sentence year leads to a 4 to 
7 percentage point increase in recidivism after release.159  
Accordingly, the weight of evidence supports the view that  
subjecting offenders to harsh punishment is unlikely to increase the  
prospect that they will become law-abiding citizens in the future. It  
follows that the goal of specific deterrence cannot be achieved by the 
imposition of criminal sanctions and should not influence sentencing 
practice, particularly the nature, structure, and content of proposed  
criminal sanctions. 
2. General Deterrence (Also) Does Not Work 
The other form of deterrence is general deterrence. This is the  
theory that harsh penalties will reduce crime because many potential  
offenders will not engage in conduct that can result in them being subject 
to criminal sanctions. There are in fact two forms of general deterrence: 
marginal and absolute. Marginal general deterrence is the view that there 
is a connection between offence severity and the crime rate. Absolute 
general deterrence is the more modest claim that the mere existence of 
criminal sanctions, irrespective of their severity, will reduce crime.160 
The empirical data on general deterrence suggests that absolute general 
deterrence is a valid theory. However, marginal general deterrence seems 
to be flawed. 
This seems to be the case in relation to all penalty types. There has 
been a considerable degree of debate regarding the efficacy of capital 
punishment to deter crime.161 However, the weight of evidence and  
informed sentiment162 suggests that there is no firm basis for believing 
that capital punishment reduces crime. The most wide-ranging recent 
analysis of the impact of the death penalty on crime is by the National 
Research Council of the National Academies, which was released in 
2012. The report concluded: 
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[R]esearch to date on the effect of capital punishment on homicide 
is not informative about whether capital punishment decreases,  
increases, or has no effect on homicide rates. Therefore, the  
committee recommends that these studies not be used to inform  
deliberations requiring judgments about the effect of the death  
penalty on homicide. Consequently, claims that research  
demonstrates that capital punishment decreases or increases the 
homicide rate by a specified amount or has no effect on the  
homicide rate should not influence policy judgments about capital 
punishment.163  
The National Research Council, in a more recent report published 
in 2014, analysed a large number of studies that examined the connection 
between harsh criminal sanctions (other than capital punishment—and 
especially longer prison terms stemming from mandatory minimum  
penalties) and the crime rate and noted that the weight of evidence does 
not support the view that harsh penalties reduce crime. The report states: 
Ludwig and Raphael (2003) find no deterrent effect of enhanced 
sentences for gun crimes; Lee and McCrary (2009) and Hjalmarsson 
(2009) find no evidence that the more severe penalties that attend 
moving from the juvenile to the adult justice system deter  
offending; and Helland and Tabarrok (2007) find only a small  
deterrent effect of the third strike of California’s three strikes law. 
As a consequence, the deterrent return to increasing already long 
sentences is modest at best.164  
The extract above, while doubting the link between harsher  
penalties and less crime, suggests that there is a connection between  
lower crime and the perception in people’s minds that if they commit an 
offence, they will be apprehended and subjected to some form of a  
criminal sanction. This is consistent with the theory of absolute general 
deterrence and the orthodox understanding about the considerations that 
reduce crime. 
Perhaps the strongest evidence substantiating absolute general  
deterrence comes from crime-rate and policing patterns in the United 
States over the past thirty years. The past three decades have seen a  
significant reduction in crime165 and a big increase in police numbers.166 
This connection is not necessarily causative because of the many other 
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changes that occurred during this period, which may also have impacted 
the crime rate, such as better police methods, increased penalties, or 
greater incarceration numbers. However, the evidence suggests that the 
increased perceived likelihood of detection has contributed substantially 
to the reduction in crime.167 
After evaluating the large number of surveys analysing the  
connection between more police and the crime rate, Professor Raymond 
Paternoster at the University of Maryland concludes: 
What we are left with, then, is that clearly police presence deters 
crime, but it is probably very difficult to say with any degree of  
precision how much it deters. Let us take Levitt’s estimate as a  
reasonable guess, that increasing the size of the police force by 10% 
will reduce crime by about 4% or 5%.168  
Accordingly, marginal general deterrence seems to be a flawed  
theory, while absolute general deterrence is a sound theory. The keys to 
reducing crime are (i) ensuring that criminal sanctions (which people 
would want to avoid) exist and (ii) putting in place processes whereby 
potential offenders perceive they will be apprehended if they commit a 
crime. The proposed new sanctions are adequate in this regard, given that 
people would seek to avoid them and that they can be implemented  
relatively easily. 
3. Incapacitation 
Incapacitation is often used interchangeably with the objective of 
community protection. Incapacitation protects the community by  
imprisoning offenders, thus ensuring that during their period of  
incarceration they cannot commit other offences in the community. It is 
important to understand that the effectiveness of incapacitation cannot be 
evaluated solely by reference to the inability of offenders to commit 
crime while in prison. Incapacitation is only effective as a form of  
community protection if offenders would have engaged in criminal  
conduct had they not been imprisoned.169 
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There are two types of incapacitation: selective and general.  
Selective incapacitation targets individual offenders. It contends that  
offenders who will reoffend should be imprisoned. Its effectiveness is 
contingent upon the accuracy of predicting which offenders will 
reoffend. Much of the research in this area has been focused on offenders 
who have committed serious offences.170 
A wide-ranging analysis in the 1990s of the data regarding the  
capacity of any discipline to predict future criminal behaviour noted that 
predictive techniques “tend to invite overestimation of the amount of 
incapacitation to be expected from marginal increments in  
imprisonment.”171 More recent actuarial tools have been developed to 
score a person’s level of risk by mapping his or her profile to variables 
that are known risk factors. Structured professional judgment and  
criminogenic risk assessment also use a range of variables,172 which are 
designed to be more nuanced than actuarial tools because they aim to not 
only predict the likelihood of violence, but also the imminence, severity, 
and possible targets of the risk.173 These more recent attempts to  
accurately predict dangerousness in the context of violent and sexual  
offences have also proven to be deficient.174 
The other form of incapacitation is general incapacitation.175 This is 
a much cruder theory and approach. It involves imprisoning offenders 
simply because they have committed a criminal offence on the basis that 
while in prison they cannot inflict harm in the general community. Little 
or no effort is normally made to predict future offending patterns,  
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whether on the basis of previous criminal history or other  
considerations.176 There is no clear line between selective and general 
incapacitation, and the difference is often simply one of degree. While 
selective incapacitation focuses on individual offenders and general  
incapacitation is population-based, once large numbers of offenders are 
imprisoned on the basis of predictive criteria (such as prior criminality), 
which is demonstrably flawed, then a process that may have initially had 
the appearance of selective incapacitation turns into a system of general 
incapacitation. All jurisdictions punish recidivists more severely than 
first-time offenders.177 Often the extent of the premium is so significant 
that this has effectively evolved into a process of general  
incapacitation.178 
Theoretically, general incapacitation should work because the more 
people there are in prison, the fewer people there are who could commit 
crime in the general community. Accordingly, it should follow that this 
will reduce the crime rate. And indeed, the weight of evidence supports 
the view that general incapacitation works. 
In the United States between 1993 and 2010, the rate of violent  
victimization rates decreased by 76% and the decline in total household 
property crime victimization was 64%.179 During this period, the  
imprisonment rate rose from 1.37 million to 2.27 million prisoners.180 At 
face value, these figures suggest a causal link between imprisoning 
greater numbers of offenders and an effective reduction in the crime rate. 
Professor William Spelman has calculated that up to 21% of crime 
reduction is attributable to the increased rate of imprisonment.181 Other 
studies support the success of incapacitation but remain equally unclear 
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about its precise impact.182 A recent report from the Executive Office of 
the President of the United States, titled Economic Perspectives on  
Incarceration and the Criminal Justice System,183 notes: 
Criminal sanctions have the capacity to reduce crime through  
deterrence and incapacitation; however, marginal increases in  
incarceration may have small and declining benefits. Despite a large 
expansion in the prison population over the last several decades, a 
large body of research has generally found that the aggregate impact 
of incarceration on crime is modest and that it declines as the prison 
population grows. Researchers who study crime and incarceration 
believe that the true impact of incarceration on crime reduction is 
small, with a 10 percent increase in incarceration decreasing crime 
by just 2 percent or less.184  
A similar conclusion was reached by the National Research Council 
in its 2014 survey of the data regarding the impact of incapacitation  
policy in the United States in recent decades. The panel concluded: 
Many studies have attempted to estimate the combined  
incapacitation and deterrence effects of incarceration on crime using 
panel data at the state level from the 1970s to the 1990s and 2000s. 
Most studies estimate the crime-reducing effect of incarceration to 
be small and some report that the size of the effect diminishes with 
the scale of incarceration. Where adjustments are made for the  
direct dependence of incarceration rates on crime rates, the  
crime-reducing effects of incarceration are found to be larger. Thus, 
the degree of dependence of the incarceration rate on the crime rate 
is crucial to the interpretation of these studies. Several studies  
influential for the committee’s conclusions in Chapters 3 and 4 find 
that the direct dependence of the incarceration rate on the crime rate 
is modest, lending credence to a small crime-reduction effect on  
incarceration. However, research in this area is not unanimous and 
the historical and legal analysis is hard to quantify. . . . On balance, 
panel data studies support the conclusion that the growth in  
incarceration rates reduced crime, but the magnitude of the crime 
reduction remains highly uncertain and the evidence suggests it was 
unlikely to have been large.185  
While general incapacitation seems to have some validity, one  
constant finding is that it is usually most effective in relation to minor 
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crime, although some success can also be achieved in relation to more 
serious crimes.186 This is because minor offenders reoffend more  
frequently than serious offenders. 
The effectiveness of general incapacitation for relatively minor  
offences is supported by an Australian study published in 2006 titled, 
How Much Crime Does Prison Stop? The Incapacitation Effect of Prison 
On Burglary.187 The study measured the impact of imprisonment on  
burglary rates. It concluded: 
[A]t least so far as burglary is concerned, prison does seem to be an 
effective crime control tool. Our best estimate of the incapacitation 
effect of prison on burglary (based on the assumption that burglars 
commit an average of 38 burglaries per year when free) is 26  
percent. This estimate does not appear to be overly sensitive to the  
value of offending frequency we assume. . . . These percentage  
effects might not seem large but in absolute terms an incapacitation 
effect of 26 per cent is equivalent to preventing over 44,700  
burglaries per annum.188  
However, the report then noted that the cost associated with using 
imprisonment as a tool to reduce the burglary rate was too high: 
The fact that prison is effective in preventing a large number of 
burglaries raises the question of whether increased use of  
imprisonment would be an effective way of further reducing the 
burglary rate. Our findings on this issue, like those of incapacitation 
studies in Britain and the United States (Cohen 1978; Tarling 1993), 
are not that encouraging. They suggest that a doubling of the  
sentence length for burglary would cost an additional $26 million 
per annum but would only reduce the annual number of burglaries 
by about eight percentage points. A doubling of the proportion of 
convicted burglars would produce a larger effect (about 12  
percentage points) but only if those who are the subject of our new 
penal policy offend as frequently as those who are currently being 
imprisoned. Given what we know about the frequency of offending 
amongst burglars who do not currently receive a prison sentence, 
this seems highly unlikely.189  
Thus, in relation to relatively minor offences, incapacitation works. 
However, while confining repeat minor criminals clearly disables them 
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from committing further offences in the community for a period of time, 
it almost certainly does not justify the unrestrained use of imprisonment 
to combat nonserious crime.190 These offenders should be subjected to an 
incapacitative penalty, but governments need to develop more intelligent 
alternatives to imprisonment that can monitor the activities of recidivist 
minor offenders at a fraction of the cost of imprisonment.191 It follows 
that the education and employment sanction would, in many cases, not 
be appropriate for offenders who are habitual criminals. Instead, EM 
would be most suitable for this type of offender. 
Given the limits of predicting serious offending on the basis of  
prior convictions, selective incapacitation for serious offences, on the 
other hand, seems to be flawed. However, there is stronger evidence that 
general incapacitation does work in relation to such offences. While most 
serious offenders do not reoffend, individuals with previous convictions 
for serious offences commit such crime at a much greater frequency than 
the rest of the criminal population.192 Thus, there is some evidence  
supporting the current incapacitative regime for serious sex and violent 
offenders. They could theoretically also be subjected to monitoring  
sanctions. However, it is not clear that this would be a desirable reform. 
While such sanctions could monitor the activities of these offenders, as 
noted above, arguably this response would undercut the goal of  
proportionality. 
4. Rehabilitation 
Unlike the other key sentencing goals that have been analysed 
above, rehabilitation (if it is effective) serves normally to decrease rather 
than increase penalty severity193 and hence ostensibly cannot be used as a 
counter to proposals to substitute imprisonment with less severe forms of 
sanctions. However, an argument can be mounted that the education 
sanction can have a negative impact on offender reform. Thus, an  
assessment of the rehabilitative ideal is necessary. 
Following extensive research conducted between 1960 and 1974, 
Robert Martinson, a former sociologist, concluded in an influential paper 
that empirical studies had not established that any rehabilitative  
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programs had worked in reducing recidivism.194 The Panel of the  
National Research Council in the United States, several years after this 
work, also noted that there were no significant differences between the 
subsequent recidivism rates of offenders regardless of the form of  
punishment. They concluded, “This suggests that neither rehabilitative 
nor criminogenic effects operate very strongly.”195 
A more recent wide-ranging Australian study regarding the  
effectiveness of rehabilitation for the Australian Institute of  
Criminology196 focused on changes and improvements to prison-based 
correction rehabilitation programs in the custodial environment since 
2004, when the previous report was issued.197 The report summarized 
recent cross-jurisdictional studies into the effectiveness of certain  
rehabilitation programs. It noted that while there were mixed results, 
there were some programs that reported positive outcomes.198 
This was especially the case in relation to sexual offender  
programs, where some studies showed that the recidivism rate of  
offenders completing the program was about half that of other  
offenders.199 The results of programs directed toward violent offenders 
were less positive, but a wide-ranging review of studies focusing on 
United Kingdom programs noted that reductions in offending for violent 
offences by around seven to eight percent had occurred.200 There is no 
cogent evidence supporting the effectiveness of domestic violence or 
victim awareness programs.201 However, drug and alcohol programs have 
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been shown to be effective at reducing substance abuse and  
reoffending.202 
This assessment is consistent with the findings of Ojmarrh Mitchell, 
David B. Wilson, and Doris L. MacKenzie, who undertook a major  
analysis of studies into the effectiveness of drug treatment programs in 
prison.203 The studies they focused on related to drug users and compared 
reoffending patterns of offenders who completed a drug rehabilitation 
program with those who did not complete a program, or completed only 
a minimum program between the years 1980 and 2004. They analysed 
sixty-six studies in total.204 The report concluded: “Overall, this  
meta-analytic synthesis of evaluations of incarceration based drug  
treatment programs found that such programs are modestly effective in 
reducing recidivism.”205 Moreover, it noted that programs that dealt with 
the multiple problems of drug users (termed therapeutic communities) 
were the most successful, whereas there was no evidence to support good 
outcomes associated with “boot camp” programs.206 
Thus, the weight of empirical data (though it is far from uniform or 
consistent) suggests that rehabilitative programs can reduce the  
likelihood of recidivism, especially for certain forms of offences, such as 
sex-offences. However, the actual level of knowledge regarding the  
impact of rehabilitative programs on recidivism rates is slight, and  
arguably, no policy or legal changes should be heavily influenced by the 
availability of these programs. If firm evidence emerges that offender or 
offence-specific programs can considerably reduce recidivism, then there 
is no reason that offenders subjected to the education or employment 
sanction cannot be permitted or required to undertake such programs. 
However, one activity that is known to meaningfully lower  
reoffending levels is participation and completion of a generalized  
educational program (in contrast to offence or offender specific  
courses).207 There is relatively persuasive evidence that offenders who 
complete postsecondary education programs recidivate at considerably 
lower rates than other offenders. It has been noted that: 
Studies clearly demonstrate that prisoners who participate in post-
secondary correctional education have lower recidivism rates than 
those who do not have access to higher education while  
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incarcerated. For example, one analysis examined 15 different  
studies conducted during the 1990s and found that 14 of these  
studies showed reduced recidivism for former prisoners who had 
participated in postsecondary correctional education. Recidivism 
rates for these individuals were, on average, 46 percent lower than 
for ex-offenders who had not taken college classes (Chappell 2004). 
Such studies indicate that providing higher education to prisoners 
can help ensure that they will not return to prison after release.208  
The completion of such courses also enhances the job prospects of 
offenders and increases their average earnings after they are released 
from prison.209 
In light of this, it could be countered that stripping educational 
qualifications from offenders will have a negative impact on their  
prospects of rehabilitation. However, this criticism is not sound. The 
process of attaining an education is not simply related to obtaining  
employment-related skills and knowledge. Learning assists people in 
developing their cognitive capacities and problem-solving skills. It also 
enhances their judgment. None of these capacities are diminished by the 
suspension or removal of their formal qualifications. Accordingly, it is 
doubtful that the education sanction would lead offenders to make poorer 
choices regarding their future conduct. 
A stronger argument can, however, be made that offenders (who do 
not have existing educational qualifications) should not be denied the 
opportunity to pursue an education given the link between postsecondary 
education and lower offending. This is a powerful argument, in the  
context of a move towards a more progressive sentencing system.  
Accordingly, this form of the education sanction should be used  
sparingly. It should only be used in circumstances when the employment 
sanction and EM monitoring are not suitable because, for example, the 
offender has no existing employment and has previously breached EM 
restrictions. However, even in those circumstances, it is important to note 
that the offender’s prospects of reoffending are probably not increased 
given that but for the availability of this sentencing option, the offender 
would have been incarcerated. As emerging evidence has shown, one 
effect of imprisonment is that it increases future offending levels. 
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B. Refining the Use of the Proposed New Sanctions in Light  
of the Appropriate Aims of Sentencing 
Accordingly, an examination of the efficacy of the sentencing  
system to achieve the objectives of specific deterrence, general  
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation suggests that none of these 
aims will be frustrated by the development and implementation of the 
new proposed sanctions. However, evaluating the suitability of the  
sanctions through the lens of the appropriate objectives of sentencing has 
resulted in some refinements regarding the optimal use of the sanctions. 
Thus, it emerges that for recidivist minor offenders the most appropriate 
alternative sanction is EM. Further, the prohibition on an offender from 
undertaking a formal course of education should be used sparingly as a 
sanction—only when the employment sanction and EM are not suitable. 
V. ADDICTION TO IMPRISONMENT: COST EFFICIENCY BY OFFSHORING 
TO EMERGING ECONOMIES 
If it is necessary to jail offenders—and we recognise that public 
safety impels the imprisonment of violent and sexual offenders—this has 
to be done in a cost-efficient and humane way. The evidence indicates 
that many states are not achieving these goals: U.S. prisons are both  
costly and overcrowded. As the U.S. Supreme Court noted in scathing 
language in Brown v. Plata: 
The degree of overcrowding in California’s prisons is exceptional. 
California’s prisons are designed to house a population just under 
80,000, but at the time of the three-judge court’s decision the  
population was almost double that. The State’s prisons had operated 
at around 200% of design capacity for at least 11 years. Prisoners 
are crammed into spaces neither designed nor intended to house  
inmates. As many as 200 prisoners may live in a gymnasium,  
monitored by as few as two or three correctional officers. As many 
as 54 prisoners may share a single toilet.210  
If that is the reality, then expediency must be consistently applied at 
all relevant levels. This means that the cost of imprisonment should be 
minimised. One option is to take advantage of differences in prison costs 
across the U.S. and locate incarceration facilities in states with low costs. 
Then, prisoners could be housed in these cheaper states regardless of 
where they were convicted and sentenced. Such practices appear to be 
widespread and are increasingly employed as states have seen their  
corrections budget increase by nearly four-fold in the past two  
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decades.211 In some instances, prisoners are being housed 1,000–3,000 
miles away from their home state. 
We suggest that corrections authorities be provided with the  
autonomy to shop for jail beds with price as a relevant consideration. 
This will open up a robust market for prison spots and areas currently 
suffering from economic deprivation will be able to compete for jail  
provisions. Indeed, there is evidence that officials make good choices 
when provided with some autonomy, ultimately increasing net social 
welfare. For instance, in Washington State, because of incentives  
provided by the payment system and a budget deficit, the News Tribune 
documents: 
Tacoma pays Fife $65 per day for each inmate, plus a $20 booking 
fee. Fife sends some of those inmates to Yakima, and pays $52.75 a 
day to house them, with no booking fee (because booking has  
already taken place). Thus, for each Tacoma inmate, Fife gains 
$12.25 in profit per day. Yakima picks up the cost of transporting 
inmates. Fife’s contracts with other jails show similar profit  
margins.212  
The legal regime for interstate transfers is provided primarily by the 
National Interstate Compact for Corrections, the New England  
Corrections Compact, and the Western Corrections Compact. California 
had more than 8,300 of its prison inmates in facilities in Arizona,  
Mississippi, and Oklahoma at the end of 2013.213 Following the 2011 
Supreme Court ruling that overcrowded prison conditions were in  
violation of the Eighth Amendment,214 California had little choice but to 
seek the transfer of some prisoners out of state. However, this policy 
seems to have run into trouble with the court directing the state to not 
enter into any more contracts with private providers to transfer prisoners 
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out of state.215 Judicial interference in transfers is largely unnecessary as 
long as strict criteria are followed. 
Transfers should ideally be voluntary. In situations where inmates 
decline to be transferred, the jail authorities should be able to effect 
transfer subject to the fulfilment of clear criteria. The Emergency  
Proclamation issued in California in 2006 offers a good guideline for 
involuntary transfers.216 It provided that inmates who satisfied the  
following requirements would receive priority in transfer decisions: 
 1. Inmates who: (a) have been previously deported by the federal 
government and are criminal aliens subject to immediate  
deportation; or (b) have committed an aggravated felony as defined 
by federal statute and are subject to deportation. 
2. Inmates who are paroling outside of California. 
3. Inmates who have limited or no family or supportive ties in  
California based on visitation records and/or other information 
deemed relevant and appropriate by the CDCR Secretary. 
4. Inmates who have family or supportive ties in a transfer state. 
5. Other inmates as deemed appropriate by the CDCR Secretary.217  
We advocate for the employment of such criteria by prison officials 
in selecting prisoners for transfers to out of state locations. 
Aside from the in-country relocation of prisoners, there have been 
proposals in the U.S. to situate prisons in cheaper locations abroad. For 
instance, when Arnold Schwarzenegger was Governor of California, he 
vetoed a proposal to locate prisons in Mexico to house illegal  
immigrants.218 He is quoted to have said: 
California give [sic] Mexico the money . . . We pay them to build a 
prison down in Mexico and then we have those undocumented  
immigrants be down there in a prison and with their prison guards 
and all this. It will halve the costs to build the prisons and halve the 
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costs to run the prisons. That is money—again, a billion dollars 
right there—that can go into higher education.219  
This proposal is not as novel as it was made out to be. In 1997, the 
Correctional Services Corporation proposed, with the support of the  
governor of Arizona and other officials, to build a prison in Mexico to 
house 1,600 of Arizona’s illegal immigrant offenders.220 There may be 
good policy reasons, in addition to financial exigency for transferring 
immigrant offenders to their home states. For instance, there are  
language and cultural factors that might make the period of incarceration 
in the home state preferable to serving time in the U.S. In turn, this might 
translate into rehabilitation of the offender. This thinking is embodied in 
international instruments on the transfer of prisoners. For instance,  
paragraph 1 of the United Nations Model Agreement states: 
The social resettlement of offenders should be promoted by  
facilitating the return of persons convicted of crime abroad to their 
country of nationality or of residence to serve their sentence at the 
earliest possible stage. In accordance with the above, States should 
afford each other the widest measure of cooperation.221  
Similarly, the Inter-American Convention on Serving Criminal  
Sentences Abroad notes in the preamble that “it is advisable that the  
sentenced person be given an opportunity to serve the sentence in the 
country of which the sentenced person is a national.”222 
Although not common, there are instances of nations entering into 
agreements for the transfer of prisoners for financial reasons. Belgium 
and the Netherlands entered into a convention on October 31, 2009, in 
order to establish a prison in the Netherlands for the execution of  
criminal sentences imposed in Belgium under Belgian law.223 The 
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agreement entered into force in February 2010 and was originally for a 
duration of three years. It is supplemented by an agreement for  
cooperation between the two countries, providing the nuts and bolts of 
the operation of the prison in relation to the transferred prisoners.  
Belgium sought to renew the convention for another year following its 
successful implementation.224 The incentives for the Dutch are clear: 
With falling prison populations, there are pressures to close jails with 
negative consequences for those employed in such facilities.225 For  
instance, the Tilburg facility which houses more than 650 inmates  
pursuant to the agreement with Belgium employs 481 people, and the 
convention appears to have saved some of these jobs because of the new 
rental income of over $38 million.226 
Several aspects of the Belgium–Netherlands convention are  
noteworthy. First, transfers to the Netherlands are not voluntary, and 
there is no requirement for the prisoner to consent to being moved.227 In 
fact, “most of the prisoners had been notified in the morning or the night 
before their transfer, except in a few cases when they had been informed 
two or three days previously.”228 When the European Committee for the 
Prevention of Torture visited the prison there were a total of 675 inmates, 
of whom 40% were Belgian nationals; 353 out of the 390 foreign  
nationals were not legal Belgian residents.229 Although there were no 
allegations of ill treatment against the Dutch prison officials, inmates did 
experience materially different conditions in a number of respects. Their 
food provisions were different (frozen food instead of food cooked 
there); rehabilitation, vocational, cultural, and recreational opportunities 
were limited; and wages were lower by a third compared to Belgium  
because of fewer working hours. There were differences in terms of the 
force used and the disciplinary sanctions employed as well: while pepper 
spray was not legal in Belgium, it could be used in the Netherlands.  
Disciplinary proceedings against prisoners encountered language  
problems, and French-speaking prisoners did not appear to comprehend 
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the proceedings or their appeal rights.230 Importantly, despite the lack of 
consent at the time of transfer, most prisoners wanted to remain there.231 
Following this example, Norway is reportedly in talks to lease 
space in the Netherlands to house its prisoners in that country.232 The two 
countries are considering a treaty whereby the prisoners would serve 
time in the Netherlands under Norwegian law and would not be released 
into that country upon the end of their jail terms. Financial imperatives 
are again driving the agreement: in the words of the Norwegian Justice 
Minister, “The situation is urgent, and we must consider short-term 
measures. Leasing prison capacity abroad may contribute to alleviating 
the situation. That is why we have started talks with the Netherlands.”233 
On the other side, the Dutch view the agreement as an economic  
opportunity beneficial to their citizens. The justice minister has said that 
taking on the Norwegian prisoners would result in 700 jobs being 
saved.234 
In the U.K., where an average prisoner costs about £40,000 per 
year, there is a considerable effort to send foreign prisoners to their  
country of origin even against their consent because imprisoning the 
10,600 foreigners is costing the state more than £400 million.235 The 
Prime Minister has spoken out publicly in this regard.236 He recently  
stated that “[the U.K. would be] using all of the influence we have to 
sign prisoner transfer agreements with those countries. Even if necessary 
rankly helping them to build prisons in their own country so we can 
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send the prisoners home.”237 The justice secretary reportedly wants more 
than 20,000 prisoners to work like regular employees within ten years in 
an effort to boost prison income to £130 million a year by 2021.238 
There are legitimate questions to be raised about the legality of  
involuntary transfers. In the U.S., the Supreme Court ruled in  
Olim v. Wakinekona that “[j]ust as an inmate has no justifiable  
expectation that he will be incarcerated in any particular prison within a 
State, he has no justifiable expectation that he will be incarcerated in any 
particular State.”239 The case involved the transfer of a prisoner from 
Hawaii to California, and the Court went on to say that because of  
overcrowding, “[s]tatutes and interstate agreements recognize that, from 
time to time, it is necessary to transfer inmates to prisons in other 
States.”240 In Burke v. Romine, the Third Circuit Court held that “the 
transfer of a prisoner for reasons related to a legitimate penological  
interest is a matter within the discretion of the prison authorities. Burke 
has no constitutional basis on which to ground his lawsuit.”241 If such 
transfers between states at significant distances to each other have been 
recognized to be legal, we posit that international agreements to house 
prisoners abroad may also be legal, provided basic human rights  
standards are adhered to. The agreements might incorporate monitoring 
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provisions and require periodic inspections by U.S. prison officials to 
ensure compliance with standards. If our proposal is adopted, states with 
high average costs per prisoner, like New York and California, will save 
billions of dollars by offshoring prisoners to cheaper locations. The  
money saved could then be invested in more beneficial social projects, 
such as education and infrastructure. 
A corollary consequence of the impetus to locate prisons in  
countries offering comparative advantages in terms of price might be the 
reduction of prison costs at home. Evidence from countries that engaged 
in bidding and contracting with private prison providers shows that the 
public prisons became more efficient as a result of the resultant  
benchmarking with the private sector.242 
To be sure, several objections can be raised against our model for 
housing offenders in prisons located in cheaper countries. First,  
transferring offenders to facilities in other countries separates them from 
their families and local communities. This imposes expenses upon family 
members who might wish to visit their relatives in jail. For instance, even 
if a prisoner is moved from California to Mexico, a family member 
might have to spend more than $1,000 in order to visit him in jail.243 This 
is likely to be a prohibitive expense for many families with the result that 
the number of overall visitations might decline, which could contribute 
to the isolation of the prisoner from the few potentially positive  
relationships he might actually possess. In turn, this has collateral  
consequences including depression for both innocent family members 
and prisoners. 
Nevertheless, this concern does not necessarily apply in every  
situation, and many prisoners may not have familial connections with an  
interest in regular visits. The precise nature of the family relationship 
may also have to be assessed. If the prisoner is single and does not have 
any dependents, the transfer decision might be straightforward. A  
prisoner with a spouse might be in a different position to one with just a 
parent or distant family member. Similarly, prisoners with adult children 
who are living separately are in a different position than those with minor 
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children who were living with the prisoner. Therefore, a case-by-case 
approach to transferring prisoners to cheaper jails could alleviate these 
problems. Indeed the Inter-American convention suggests this approach 
in Article V: 
In taking a decision on the transfer of a sentenced person, the states 
parties may consider, among other factors . . . the state of health of 
the sentenced person; and the family, social, or other ties the  
sentenced person may have in the sentencing state and the receiving 
state.244  
Further, visitation does not necessarily have to be in the flesh. With 
the advances in video conferencing and internet chatting, offshore  
prisons can be required to provide these facilities to an adequate level in 
order to meet visitation needs of prisoners with families. It is common 
for family members to interact with each other via such technology in 
contemporary society because of work and other reasons for living at a 
distance, and prisoners need not be an exception. Moreover, there is no 
reason in principle that prisoners cannot be provided with internet access. 
Of course, there is a risk that they could abuse this, for example, by  
contacting past victims; however, it is possible to monitor every activity 
and communication undertaken by an individual on the internet. Thus, 
this risk for abusing this facility can be significantly curtailed. Internet 
access by prisoners would enable them to have regular and extensive 
communication with relatives and friends, but it would also enable  
prisoners to stay informed of changes to the communities they will enter 
upon release.245 Thus, objections relating to distancing prisoners and 
relatives are not overwhelming. 
A second objection would likely be that prison conditions in other 
countries might vastly differ from our own and pose adverse human 
rights consequences for prisoners. Jails in cheaper, third-world countries 
might be over-crowded, unhygienic, prone to violence from other  
inmates and guards, and corrupt. In addition, these jails might suffer 
from poor health care facilities and low investments in rehabilitation op-
portunities. However, these issues can be addressed by including  
minimum requirements in the inter-state agreement. 
The Inter-American convention states in Article VII(2) that “the 
sentence of a sentenced person who is transferred shall be served in  
accordance with the laws and procedures of the receiving state, including 
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application of any provisions relating to reduction of time of  
imprisonment or of alternative service of the sentence.” The Convention 
Against Torture might also come into play where there is a record of  
torture in a state’s prisons. Specifically, Article III states that no party 
“shall expel, return (‘refouler’) or extradite a person to another State 
where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in 
danger of being subjected to torture.”246 In determining whether there are 
substantial grounds warranting such a belief, the state “shall take into 
account all relevant considerations including, where applicable, the  
existence in the State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant 
or mass violations of human rights.”247 These requirements would ensure 
that prisoners in another country are treated humanely and not sent to 
prisons with a history of torture or inhumane treatment. Further, ongoing 
monitoring of the conditions in the prisons would reduce the likelihood 
of prisoners being subjected to unacceptable conditions. 
Lastly, critics may claim that transferring prisoners to offshore  
locations might impinge on a prisoner’s right to counsel and legal  
representation. In addition to physical distance as a prohibitive factor in 
maintaining contact with existing legal representation, those who might 
need a lawyer to pursue legal recourse while in jail will not have easy 
access to trained lawyers because the legal system is likely to be different 
in another jurisdiction. While this poses challenges, the offshore prison 
can be required to provide video conferencing facilities and a list of U.S. 
lawyers who can be accessed by prisoners in a confidential environment. 
For instance, a room with privacy that can be booked by a prisoner might 
satisfy the requirement of providing access to counsel. 
Thus, there are considerable financial savings that could be made if 
correction authorities had greater capacity to house prisoners in the most 
cost-effective locations. Moreover, potential risks associated with this are 
foreseeable and, with sensible planning, can be mitigated. 
CONCLUSION 
Punishment is an essential part of the criminal justice system. Many 
offenders are deserving of severe punishment. The reflex that criminals 
deserve to be punished and imprisoned is understandable. What is  
unjustifiable is the massive increase in prison numbers over the past few 
decades. This growth in the prison industry has occurred, but it has not 
been planned nor has it been deliberate. 
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The massive expenditure on prisons requires a strategic and  
forensic analysis about the nature of criminal punishment and the most 
efficient and effective means to achieve attainable and appropriate  
objectives of sentencing. This Article has undertaken such an analysis. 
Most offenders who are currently imprisoned should be punished 
through other forms of sanctions. The new sanctions come in two main 
forms: employment/education and monitoring. The employment and  
education sanctions have been developed against the backdrop of a  
theoretical examination of the nature of criminal punishment: the  
interests that individuals covet and the principle of proportionality. The 
monitoring sanction invokes new technology to provide a more effective 
solution to the centuries-old problem of finding an effective means to 
punish serious offenders while ensuring they do not reoffend. 
The implementation of both of these sanctions could reduce prison 
numbers in the United States by more than two-thirds. This would result 
in massive public revenue savings, while increasing the fairness and  
effectiveness of the criminal justice system. A resistance to the  
development of these new sanctions and retention of the status quo  
regarding the use of imprisonment would constitute a grievously  
misplaced political decision. 
However, the criminal justice system does not have a proud history 
of being driven by evidence-based practices. In this realm, expediency, 
most typically manifesting in the “tough on crime” mantra, is the  
pervasive ideology. Our represented political representatives owe it to 
the community to minimise the cost of mass incarceration and consider 
offshoring and outsourcing. Under our proposals, prison officials would 
adopt a case-by-case analysis to transfer prisoners to locations in cheaper 
states or developing countries. This would drastically reduce prison 
costs, providing governments with funds to redress shortcomings in  
important social services, such as health and education. It is to be  
emphasised, however, that this proposal is a fallback position to the most 
desirable solution to reducing the cost of imprisonment—reducing prison 
numbers—and it is hoped that the reforms proposed in this Article will 
assist in achieving this outcome. 
